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M A R X I S M  AND PSYCHOANALYSIS  
B Y  P A U L  A .  B A R A N  
My topic tonight is one which by profession I am hardly quali- 
fied to discuss. I am an economist, and my concern with psychoanaly- 
sis is only marginal. If nevertheless I am going to speak about "Marx- 
ism and Psychoanalysis," it is because as a social scientist and as a 
Marxist I have to consider the social process as a whole; I have to 
study the phenomena which play a major role in the social life of our 
time. And it is a fact which we should face squarely: psychoanalysis 
today exercises an influence which is probably more pervasive than 
that of any other doctrine or school of thought which contributes to 
the formation of our "collective mind." It would be instructive to poll 
this large audience and to find out how many came here tonight be- 
cause Marxism appears in the announcement and how many because 
of their interest in psychoanalysis. 
Ever since Marxism stepped upon the intellectual stage as a 
powerful effort to understand historical development, its most impor- 
tant bourgeois adversary has been what I may call "psychologism." 
Although appearing in different forms, assuming different guises, and 
presented in different terms, psychologism has always rested on two 
main pillars: first, the reduction of the social process to the behavior 
of the individual; and second, the treatment of the individual as 
governed by psychic forces deriving thek strength from instincts which 
are considered to be deeply imbedded in "human nature," with 
"human nature" in turn constituting an essentially stable, biotically 
determined structure. 
Gradually, in the fight of far-reaching changes in the real world 
and of accumulating historical and anthropological knowledge, these 
concepts became increasingly untenable, and traditional psychologism 
was forced into the background. What took its place is a new version 
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of psychologism: an amalgam of Freudian psychoanalysis and some 
quasi-Marxian, mciological noti-a doctrine which I propose to 
call ''socio-psychologism,'s Thir new arrival on the ideological scene d I 
distinguishes itself from its defunct predecessor by recognizing freely , I  
that the individual is not entirely a man for himself but is influenced 
by society, is somehow affected by the social setting within which he 
grows up. What is crucial, however, is that society in sociopsycholog- 
ism is viewed as "environmmt": family, occupational stratum, inter- 
racial relations, residential community, and the like. 
We must realize the implications of both positions. In the first, if 
it is "human natud' that determines the historical process, and if this ' 
"human nature" is unalterable, then all attempts to achieve a radical 
transformation of the huqan character and of the foundations of the 
social order are necessarily docaned to failure. In that case we might 
as well give up all hope for a :society without exploitation of men by 
men, without injustice, without war, because all these things-exploita- 
tion, injustice, war-are the ineluctable result of the everlasting prop- 
erties of the human animal. Encapsulated in his perennial "nature," 
man is eternally condemned to live down his original sin; he can never 
aspire to a free development in a society governed by humanism and I 
reason. It hardly needs adding that what follows from these premises 
is a conservative or indeed a reactionary attitude towards all the burn- 
ing issues of our time, an attitude close to the heart of the most "old- 
fashioned" elements of the ruling class. 
I 4
I Different conclusions &eqe from socio-psychologkm~ For the I 
propositio~ that human development b determined by the social 
"milieu" and depends on the nature of inter-personal relations-on 
conditions obtaining within thC f k d y  and so forth-leads obviously 
to the' conclusion that significant changes (improvements) in human 
existence can be brought about by suitable "adjustments" in the pre- 
vailing environment. More togetherness and love, more schools and 
bpitals, and more coops and family wu1seIing services then become 
the appropriate response to the human predicament in our society. 
As in the case of all id601ogies, n e i t h a ~ p s y c h o ] . ~  nor socio- 
p s y c h o 1 ~  .is a mere halluckg&m wholly unrelated to the real 
world. Each reflects, albeit in a distorted, ideological manner, an as- 
pect of the actual, existential condition of men in capitalist society. 
By enunciating a manifest li&the save power of the individual 
in our society-psychologism points unmistakably to the lonebess, un- 
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relatedness, and impotence of men under capitalism, and thus comes 
nearer truth than the WOW liberal claptrap treating "us" as ccm- 
truUing.and shaping our lives, ol ponWicating about national or even 
int&tional 6ccommunities'' determining their own destinies. Shdas- 
ly, in raising the principle homo homini lupus to the status of an 
eternal verity, in considering ,man to be by nature a selfish, aggressive 
monad fighting ruthlessly for a place in the market, psychologism cap- 
& more of the capitalist ndi ty  than those doctrines which would 
ha& us believe that the character of the capitalist man be changed 
by sanctimdv~ incantations concerning love, productivity, and the 
brotherhood of men. For, with exploitation, injustice, and war having 
molded for centuries the character of men, treating the existing human 
species as a formidable rock not easily displaced or transformed is un- 
doubtedly more appropriate than the view of the superficial meliorist 
who would reshape human attitudes by intensified preaching, by larger 
federal grants-in-aid to education, by strengthening the Pure Food and 
DrugAdminktration, or by electing a Democratic President. 
Socio-psychologism, too, xnirro~s important aspects of our society. 
By uncovering the horrors of our cultur+the dismal state of our edu- 
cational system, the misery of our cities, the abominable "climate" in 
which Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and unemployed whites live 
in this country-socio-psychologism is nearer the realities of capitalism 
than the enthusiastic celebrators of free and unhampered private enter- 
prise. At the same time, by attributing this social condition to "our" 
l&k of enlightenment, to "oui' incapacity for purposeful action, to 
the power of "conventional wisdom," and to similar psychic "facts," it 
expresses the refusal to see the fundamental causes of the existing 
mdl'aise, a refusal that constitutes the characteristic and indeed deci- 
sive elemkt of the ruling ideology. Moreover, the insistence of socio- 
psychologism on the curability of all of these ills by means of various 
add sundry "adjustments" is part 'and parcel of the spirit of manipula- 
tion in which the Big Business executive "fixes" the problems confront- 
in; & corporation by such methods as establishing recreation facilities 
- 
f o i  his workers, or appropriating more money for market research or 
ad~ds ing ,  or by initiating some fancy product variation. Thus socio- 
ps~chologhm becomes one of the most important components-if not 
the . most . important component-of the ideology of monopoly capital- 
ispl which+eeks to find ways of elkbating the most crying i r ra t id -  
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ties, the most conspicuous injustices of the capitalist system in order to 
preserve aid-to strengthen its basic institutions. . - 
But to realize and to unveil the ideological nature of both psy- 
chologism and socio-psychologism is only one part of what needs 
to be done. Even this job can be-adequately performed only if the 
differences between the two doctrines are clearly understood, and if 
this ideological development is carefully analyzed as a refledon (and 
an aspect) of the transformation of the underlying economic, social, 
and political reality itself. Yet, as in the case of most problems posed 
by the emergence and evolution of monopoly capitalism, Marxism has 
been seriously remiss in coping with this matter. Failing to distinguish 
between old-fashioned psychologism and its modern, more sophisti- 
cated offshoot, Marxists, both in the West and in the USSR, have 
been seeking to refute the latter by employing arguments applicable 
only to the former. This has been particularly tempting since marshall- 
ing the arguments called for little effort: all of them are readily avail- 
able in the works of Marx and Engels, as well as in the writings of 
later Marxists. 
Even more serious is that another, equally important part of the 
Marxist commitment has been left unattended to. This is the separa- 
tion of the wheat from the chaff, the distillation of whatever genuine 
scientific insights may be submerged in the ideological flood of socio- 
psychologism. For to the development of Marxism nothing is more 
essential than the systematic identification and absorption of such 
scientific advances as are attained by bourgeois scholarship-accom- 
panied by relentless unmasking and debunking of its manifold ideo- 
logidal ingredients. 
Thus in dealing with psychoanalysis-a doctrine which is the 
mainstay of socio-psychologism and which differs significantly from 
earlier theories underlying psychologism-Marxists have taken the 
position that all of it is nothing but ideology void of scientific content. 
This attitude has been based to a large extent on the notion that 
Freud's abiding concern with the irrational underpinnings of the con- 
duct of men is tantamount to glorification of irrationality, to its eleva- 
tion to the status of the ultimate, inexplicable, irreducible determin- 
ant of human activity. If such had been Freud's view, there would be 
little indeed .to distinguish him from all and sundry philosophers of 
romanticism and existentialism. Yet although Freud undoubtedly had 
strong .tendencies in that direction-particularly apparent in s o k  of 
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his later writings-the bulk of his work is inspired by a different in- 
tention. Having recognized what is undisputable-that irrationality 
governs a large part of human behavior-Freud directed most of his 
life's effort to an attempt at a rational understanding of irrational 
motivations. Far from conside+g irrationality to be an elemental 
phenomenon inaccessible to scientific analysis, Freud sought to de- 
velop a comprehensive theory providing a rational explanation of ir- 
rational drives. 
To be sure, this ambitious goal remained beyond Freud's reach. 
Nevertheless, he took the matter further than anyone before him, and- 
I might add-anyone after him, even if he did fail to arrive at a satis- 
factory concept of human conduct. And just as Marxism has been the 
heir and the guardian of what is most valuable and progressive in 
bourgeois culture, so it is incumbent upon Marxism today to take up 
Freud's work .where Freud left it, and to turn his insights to good use 
in the elaboration of a rational theory of human activity. 
I submit that only Marxism is able to fulfill this task. For the 
M e a n  theory of social dynamics sheds penetrating light on the 
factors principally determining human behavior. What is needed is 
to revive some of the central-albeit neglected-strands in Marxian 
thought, and to focus them on the problem at hand. While this claim 
of mine cannot be fully substantiated in a short lecture, I would like 
to attempt a cctelegram-style" outline of the relevant considerations. 
I t  is fundamental to the Marxian approach to the study of man 
that there is no such thing as an eternal, invariant "huxna,n nature." 
With due regard for what can be considered biotic constants, the char- 
acter of man is the product of the social order in which he is born, in 
which he grows up, and the air of which he inhales throughout his life; 
it is its result and indeed one of its most significant aspects. Yet it is 
of the utmost importance to understand that what is meant by "social 
orders' in Marxian theory is at most only a distant cousin of the notion 
of "society" as employed in socio-psychologism. The latter, it will be 
recalled, refers to ccenvironment," to c'inter-personal relations," and to 
similar aspects of what constitutes the surface of social existence. The 
former, on the other hand, encompasses the attained stage of the de- 
velopment of productive forces, the mode and relations of production, 
the form of social domination prevailing at any given time, all together 
constituting the basic structure of the existing social organization. 
Changes of the social order (in the Marxian understanding of that 
term), radical and shattering as they always ate, have taken centuries 
to matun h d  have oecured only a few times in the course of history. 
Chmqmndhg1y, chmges changes the nature of man have also p l r d  
at a g l d  pace; while assuming tremendous proportions- if looked at 
in fU histotical *perspective, they have bem all but imperceptible in 
the lifespan, of entire generations. Still it is a fallacy to mistake the 
sl-ess of change in the character of man for its abeeace. This error 
leads to psychologism and to the belief in the everlasting -en= of 
the human species. And it is no less fallacious to deduce from the 
existence of change its rapidity* This error in turn leads to socbt 
psychdogism and to the illusion that human beings can be "remodel- 
ed" by parsuasion or by some repair jobs within the existing Bocial 
order, that they can be manipulated into something c l i f f a t  from 
wbat that social order has made them* 
Thus a proper analysis of human motivations and conduct must 
refer to a timespan shorter than that of psychologism but longer than 
that of socio-psychologism. It has to avoid the a-historical frozenness 
of the former while escaping at the same time the newspaper-headline 
orientation of the latter. And it must consider human development in 
its tme context: the economic and social order determining the con- 
tent and molding the profile of the relevant historical epoch. Accord- 
ingly the exploration of the human character can neither rely on empty 
abstractions such as "man in general" w r  gain much insight from an 
emr~soawefd exambation of spurious coslc~etes such as the "other- 
h t e d  personality," the "tradeunion man; the "chamber of cam- 
m a e  man? OF the "& in the gray flannel suit." At the present 
tkns d in this country, the object of the investigation is the human 
being born with certain inhesited dmmcteristks and reared as a man- 
ba of a class in capitabt d t y  a+more $pecifically+h capitalist 
society's most advanced stage, the reign of manopo1y capital. . 
This suggests that-leaving biology aside--the first step of such 
an investigation has to be- dhcted toward the understanding of the 
basic factors determkhg human adsterne under the prevaXng social 
order. Outstanding among these factors is the vast expansion of so- 
ciety's productive resources. Based on a spectacular intenfication of 
the subjugation of natun (including human nature) by society, this 
growth of pductivity has promoted (and has beem promoted by). a' 
  en do us increase of rationality in the productive process as well 
as in the mental habits of men. Yet it is inherent in the capitalist ordu, 
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and indeed its most striking characteristic, that this advance in ration- 
ality has proceeded in a complex and contradictory fashion. I t  has 
been primarily an advance of partid rationality and has remained es- 
amtially confiied to segments of the social fabric, to its particular units 
and aspects, Thus the efficiency of industrial and agricultural enter- 
prises, the rationality of their administration, of their cost and price 
and profit dcula t ioq as well as of their efforts to manipulate the 
market, have reached unprecedented dimensions. But this increase in 
partial rationality has not been accompanied by a co~~esponding 
growth of total rationality, of rationality in the overall organization 
and functioning of society. In fact, the total rationality of the soda 
order has declined; the disparity between partial and total rationality 
has been growing increasingly pronounced. This can be fully realid 
if one thinks of the contrast between the automated, electronid1y con- 
trolled factory and the economy as a whole with its millions of un- 
emplayed and other millions of uselessly employed people; if one con- 
siders the efficiency with which redundant chrome and fins are being 
affied to unfunctional automobiles; or if one contemplates the pala- 
tial office towers, planned and equipped according to the last word of 
science, in which highly skilled employees devise the m a t  effative 
methods for the promotion of a new map, standing next to squalid 
slums in which families of five vegetate in one dilapidated filthy room. 
But the abyss dividing the parts from the whole is most horrifying if 
one places next to each other the breathtaking productive power har- 
nessed in the energy of the atom, and the death, the misery, the human 
degradation, that mark the existence of the great majority of mankind 
subsisting in the underdeveloped countries. 
The basic reascm for thk glaring cleavage between partial and 
total rationality, between the rising "know how," and the declining 
"know what," is the alienation of man from his means of production, 
an alienation that has become increasingly marked throughout. the 
history of capitalism and is strongly accentuated in its current mono- 
polistic phase. Indeed the concentration of the means of production 
in the hands of a small group of o ~ r e s p o n s i b l e  to no one but 
themselves and to their everlasting commitment to keep increasing 
their profibwho smoothly and rationally preside over their corpor- 
ate empires, has completed the fixation of the productive apparatus as 
a power outside and above the individd, a power dominating his 
existence but m M y  inaccessible to his control. And at no time in 
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history has this power over the vast and growing productive forces 
been to such an extent power over life and death of millions.of men, 
women, and children everywhere. 
But the most insidious, and at the same time the most portentous, 
aspect of this overwhelming power of the objectified productive rela- 
tions over the life of the individual is their capacity to determine de- 
cisively his psychic structure. For the conflict between total and partial 
rationality not only sets the tone of the entire capitalist culture; it also 
sinks deeply into the mentality of the human being brought up in and 
molded by the all-pervasive institutions, values, and habits of thought 
which make up that culture. The exigencies of the productive process 
call for the development of an increasingly well trained, literate, and 
intelligent manpower. Earning a livelihood at the conveyer belt, in the 
office, or in the sales force of the modern corporation depends on the 
possession of rational attitudes and aptitudes greatly superior to what 
was required at an earlier, less advanced stage of capitalist develop- 
ment. Much of the work that used to be guided by authority, tradi- 
tion, and intuition is now based on scientifically established procedures 
and accurate measurements. Yet, as stressed above, this highly ra- 
tionalized effort is directed towards largely irrational ends; the in- 
dividual worker is not only unconcerned with the outcome of the 
productive process in which he plays an infinitesimal part but this out- 
come has no meaning and no purpose; it cannot inform his activity 
with the knowledge of aim or with the pride of accomplishment. 
This incessantly reproduced clash between what might be called 
ccmicro-sense" and c'rnacro-madness" is, however, only one part of 
the story. The other, even more important, aspect is the profound 
impact of the lack of total rationality upon the dynamics and nature 
of partial rationality itself. I must therefore amend what I said above 
about the achievements in regard to partial rationality. For reason is 
indivisible, and the irrationality of the whole cannot coexist harmoni- 
ously with the rationality of the parts. The one continually threatens 
the other, and their antagonism expresses one of the profound con- 
tradictions of the capitalist system. Whereas the irrationality of the 
whole must be constantly maintained if exploitation, waste, and privi- 
lege, if-in one word-capitalism is to survive, the rationality of so- 
ciety's individual parts is enforced by the drive for profits and the 
competitive necessities of capitalist enterprise* Thus this partial ra- 
tionality contintially edges forward-albeit jerkily and unevenly-but 
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the advance takes place at the cost of its being warped, perverted, and 
corrupted by the irrationality of the surrounding social order. As a re- 
sult, such progress as has been attained is far from uniform. Some of 
it constitutes genuine step forward in the rational comprehension of 
the world and in the development of the forces of production. This 
applies to much of what has been accomplished in such areas as 
mathematics and natural scienca9 as well as in certain branches of 
historical research. Elsewhere, however, what parades as an increase 
in rationality is frequently nothing but the amplification and propaga- 
tion of business "know how," of the rationality of the capitalist mar- 
ket. There the intellectual effort which takes market relations for 
granted is exclusive1y directed towards manipulation in the interest 
of corporate enterprise. What it promotes is "practical intelligence," 
the capacity to make the best of a given market constellation, to maxi- 
mize one's advantages in the struggle of all against all. Thus, important 
parts of physics and chemistry have been pressed into the service of 
war and destruction; much mathematical and statistical ingenuity has 
been turned into an auxiliary of monopolistic market control and 
profit maximhtion; psychology has become a prostitute of "motiva- 
tion research" and personnel management; biology is made into a 
handmaiden of pharmaceutical rackets; and art, language, color, and 
sound have been degraded into instrumentalities of advertising. 
Under such circumstances human rationality inevitably becomes 
crippled, and its advance is pushed into a direction that bears no rela- 
tion to the prerequisites for, and the needs of, human health, happiness, 
and development. If the compulsion to take anything for granted is 
a fetter on the expansion and perfection of men's capacity to reason 
and to understand, the oppressive and stifling function of that fetter 
grows in proportion to the irrationality of what men are brought up 
not to question but to accept as a datum. -True, taking capitdim for 
granted when it was an essentially progressive social order interfered 
relatively little with (or even promoted) the development af partial 
rationality. By the same token, however, the necessity not to scrutinize 
but tb treat as part of the natural order of things the regime of mono- 
poky capital, along with all the waste and all the destruction that go 
with it, constitutes a straitjacket within which reasan cannot but 
suffocate. Thus the clash between partial and total rationality becomes 
complicated and aggravated by the no less violent conflict between 
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nar~n and the debasement of rtiason which dominates the sphexe of 
paatid r a t i d t y  itself. 
This condition has manifold psychological dcati~ns to only 
two of which I can now attempt to draw your attention. First, such 
rationality as prevails solidifies itself into a system of rules, procedures, 
and habits of thought that not only does not fiuther the satisfaction of 
human needs but becomes a formidable obstacle to human develop 
ment and, indeed, survival. As bougeois rationality tums increasingly 
into the rationality of domination, exploitation, anand war, the ordinary 
man revoIts against this obstruction to his aspirations for peace, happi- 
ness, and freedom. Yet, afflicted with ''common sense" that is studi- 
ously nurtured by all the agencies of bourgeois culture and the pain- 
cipal injunction of which is to take capitalist rationality for granted, 
he can hardly avoid identifying the rationality of buying, d h g ,  and 
profit-- with reason itself. His revolt against capitalist rational- 
ity, against the rationality of markets and profits, thus becomes a re- 
volt against reason itself, turns into anti-intellectmhn, and promotes 
aggmssiveness toward those who manage to capitahe on the rules of 
the capita&t game to thdr advantage and advancement. It renders 
him an easy prey of irrationality.. 
Irrationality and aggressiveness in our time are, theref* not 
mnamtiong of some unalterable human instincts. Nor do they express 
simply the.suppusedly "natural" rejection of reasoa. Irrationality and 
aggressiveness in our .time reflect primarily the refusal to accept as 
saamanct the rationality of capitalism. They testify to the protest 
against the mutilation and degradation of nason for the sake of capi- 
talist domination. This outcry against bourgeois rationality, as well 
as its idenEificaticm with reason as ~u4 is magdfkntly depicted~in 
Dostoev&y's Undeqround Man who 'tomits up reason" and who 
scornfuIly mijets the commandment to accept the proP0s;h that 
two times two equals four. While this strikingly exemplifies the posture 
of irrationalism, an important aspect ob the Underground Man's atti- 
tude should not be lost sight of. It is that the Underground Man, ir- 
rational and ''cnaf as he is, is actudy profoundly right in ' ' v d t i q  
up muon,'' in i n i g  to bow to the logic of two times two q d  
four. For this logic is  the logic of the capitalkt market, of the arploita- 
tion of man by man, of privileges, insecurity, and war. To be sure, 
contempt for this r a t i d t y ,  his uprising against the ~coanmon sense9' 
of human misery, is an irrational reaction to a pernicious social order. 
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But it is the only reaction available to the isolated and helples~ in- 
diiridud who, incapable of comprehending the fo- by which he ib 
b g  crushed, is unable to struggle effectively against them. Thir 
r e a h  is neurosis. 
Secondly, as I mentioned in passing earlier, the development of 
the forces of production and the advance of rationality with which it 
has been associated were based on a tremendous iatdication of 
human domination over nature. The result of this harnessing of 
natural resources to the needs of men has been a makentous rise in 
the output of goods; services, health, and literacy--combined with a 
spectacular lightening of the burden of human toil. Yet this advance. 
was achieved not merely by the expansion of human control over the 
objects and energies of the outside world; it was based on a perhaps 
even more radical subjugation of the nature of man himself. This sub- 
jugation has two separate, if closely interconnected, aspects. In the pre- 
capitalist era, it involved the emergence and development of the 
domination and exploitation of man by man. Extracting horn the 
underlying population varying quantities of economic surplus, the 
dominating and exploiting classes used this economic surplus to auiun 
their privileged positions in saciety, at the same time directing larger 
or smaller shares of the surplus to investment in productive f d t i e s  . 
or to the maintenance of military, religious, and cultural establish- 
ments. Applied to thae days, however, the expression "surplus" is a 
e~phemism. With productivity and output rising only vny slowly, the 
condition had not yet been attained in which the consumption of the 
ruling class and its outlays on productive investment and an I~@XNI 
and military and other purposes could be bared upon a genuine suf- 
ficiency of goods and services for the people. Sheer violence and ela- 
borate systems of political enforcement always played a major mle in 
the process of extraction of the requisite  resource^. Yet neither would 
havesbeen able to fulfill this task had it not been for the development 
and propagation of reIigious, legal, moral-in one word: ideological- - 
notions which sanctified the ruling classes' claims to their appropria- 
tions and which were turned in the course of centuries into a compre- 
h d v e  network of internaked thoughts, beliefs, fears, and hopes, 
compelling the people to recognize the rights and to heed the demands 
of their rulers. 
A new chapter was opened by the advent of the c a ~ ~  order. 
Naw the human Wig had to go through a further ~ C ~ S S  of "adjust- 
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megt." -To the qualities .cultivated inthe wood-hewem and water- 
d q s  4, DM- bad to be added a. new and all-bprtaat r c ~ t ~ t i ~ ~  
wgf ~ikmdiitp. For now it waq no longer sufficient torbe an OM- - 
ent and selfless serf of a cruel and rapacious squire; what was required 
henceforth was a diligent, docile, efficient, and reliable worker in a 
rati&dized, . str-hed, profit-maximizing capitalist enterprise. This 
enforced what is '.probably' one of the most far-reaching transfonna-. 
tions of "human nature" experienced th* far. If' in the course of pre- 
ceding history man had been made submissive by exploitation and 
domination, the working principles of the capitalist order demanded 
that he should acquire the abilify to calculate and the habit of acting 
. With forethought and ;te~berBtion: What was left of his elemental 
emotionality, . . of his spont&neity,'afier having been disciplined for cen- 
turies by the, whip of his, titled overlords, came now under the much 
m&e systematib, much &re chPreheniive pressure of the callously 
and accurately calculating market. 
As deliberateness in the business of earning a living-and in 
all other aspects of life as well-became the prerequisite for survival 
in eapitalist society, spontaneity came to be disdained and feared not 
only as a source of disruption of the pduction routine but as a threat 
to the stability of the class-domigated , a d  exploitative social order. 
F r m  @e very beginning of the capitalist era it was accordingly ex- 
p w d  .m, a:withering fi.e of economic sanctions and eocial opprobrium, 
aad the:a$sault against it. was mounted simultaneously by the entire 
appmatzr~ of bourgepk ideology and dture ,  including such divergent 
wmponmts aar C h & h  religion and the utilitarian philosophy. And 
in a p i W s  current, m,o;nopobtic, phase this attack has multiplied 
in scope and int-sity. Just as, human relitions in corporate empires 
came by necessity to be attuned to 'c&g friend$ and influencing 
people," so has love been " s t p d e d "  into a scientif.ically a p p d  
means of securing medically indicated sexual gratification, while. 
beauty is idenad with the precise measurements of Miss America, 
a d  nature, music2. literatureD and art are valued in exact proportion 
to the& serving as. purveyws of c c ~ ~ t i ~ n . "  Not that the campaign 
against spontaneity was ever decided upan or directed by some execu- 
tie committee of capitalist ~lders, although- attributing to Marxism 
such a view of the matter has long been the stock in trade of prof-- 
s i o d  Ma=-refuters whose ignorance of Marxism is exceeded only by 
their --pity & understand . . it. The implacable hostility toward 
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spontaneity and the powerful tendency toward its suppression are 
rather the inherent characteristics of a mode of production based on 
commodity exchange and unfolding within a system of relations of 
pduction of domination and exploitation. Far from #being a pre- 
meditated, well-planned stratagem of the ruling class, calculated to 
repress the drives and aspirations of the underlying population, both 
the ascent of deliberateness and the decay of spontaneity affected the 
members of the ruling class itself and turned them in the course of 
time into unhappy beneficiaries of an unhappy society. 
The crux of the matter, it seems to me, is that market-oriented 
deliberateness and market-induced suppression of spontaneity, "ad- 
justing" the privileged and the underprivileged alike to the require- 
ments of the capitalist system, fatally damage what Freud, and before 
him Marx and Engels, identified as the sources of human happiness: 
freedom of individual development and the capacity to experience 
sensual gratifications. Putting a severe tabu on the individual's emo- 
tionality and channeling what is left of it into an aggressiveness which 
k disciplined and directed toward the attainment of success and the 
elimination of rivals in the competitive struggle, they produce "affect- 
cripp1edness"-to use an expression of Freud-and generate the phe- 
nomenon which was put into its proper theoretical context by Manr 
in his concept of the alienation of man from +If. This alienation 
of man from himself-the maiming of the individual, the subjugation 
of his nature to the needs of capitalist enterprise, the mortal wounding 
of his spontaneity, and the molding of his personality into a self-seeking, 
deliberate, calculating, and circumspect participant in (and object of) 
the capitalist process-represents the basic framework within which 
the psychic. condition of men evolves in capitalist society. 
It  is only within this framework that I can see a promise of a 
genuine understanding of psychic disturbances in our time. As I men- 
tioned earlier, achieving such an understanding was not given to psy- 
choanalysis. To be sure, Freud's identification of sexual malfunction- 
ing as the principal source of psychic disorder represented a major 
advance in psychological thought. But what Freud's theoretical struc- 
ture fails to provideall assurances and appearances to the contrary 
notwithstanding-is a satisfactory explanation of the sexual malfunc- 
tioning itself. Not that Freud was unaware of this weakness of his 
doctrine, but it was in attempting to fill this crucially important gap 
that his efforts were least successful. It was here that he sought to find 
re* ei&w i n  pychologinn or in d o - ~ c h o l ~ :  6th~~~. in a 
concept of 'a b i W y  unchanging human nature with equally lia-: 
&anping intra-family relations as symbdhd in the ancient- O d p u s ~  
legend; or in d a c e  observations ref* to habits of child rearing 
and of sexual edighment. Neither of these a p p r d e s  en&led him 
to solve the central issue confronting py&ology at the present time: 
the specification-of the part played by more or4eso invariant 
fa~tors in the d e w a t i o n  of the psychic structure-of men, 
analysis of the profound impact upon the human-.psyche am 
the~.&emtim of man fmm himself in. the &ty of m 
capitalinn. I 
M e ,  i m p d  by the momentous accomplishments of Pavm.2 
l w  and his school, have focused attention on tbeformer aspsct of the 
matter and have tended--paradoxically enough--to sidestep MPnrb' 
mwoiutionary contribution to psychology: the d l a g y  of the psyche. 
Still, while there can. be no dispute about the importance of- phyd01 
logical factors in governing human behavior, it -is indispensable 'to 
recognize the vast atent to which the 8 c o d  and social urdea.of 
ca$ta&m and the process of alienation which it generates mdd the 
pph.ic and, indeed, the physical functioning of men in the capitalkt 
en. For it is impassible to undemand seaad rnaJfunctioning apart. 
from .the - capitdim-caumd atrophy of spontaneity; it is impossibIeC tom 
USLderstand the shridcbg capacity to experience sensual' gratifications: 
of any kind apart from the capitdim-genesated pmliferation &.deli- 
bmateness, s e l f l l q  and ~ v ~ e s s .  I w d  go further and s* 
that it 'is impmsib1e to comprehmd human -activity in w .decty-  
arapt as *an -outcapne of a dialectic interaaiaa of biotic forms a d  the 
working principles of monopoly capitalism, with the latter domha*g,-: 
subjugating, and directing the former. And it i s  crucially important to 
recognize the nature of this interaction of the detqmnimnts -of hum= 
d e n c e  under capitalimn9 because it is the powerful dynamism ab &, 
racial and economic d m  which points to the 1ocatioa of the strategic. 
levclrage which in ~~ of time will shift the histmkd gears a d :  
orient the devdopmmt .of man towatds a fuller mahation* of ht 
physical, emotional, and r a t i d  cap.citir $This leverage is to he 
L- 
found neither in tranqdikg pills nor in "social adjustments," nor+in 
the preachi~g of love, of productivity, and of. smeeting of minds." This 
leverage must be found in the eetabmeat of a more dad; mom+ 
human: society, and convendy ti the abditioa of a social OM& basedq 
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upon the domination and exploitation of man by man. Not that social- 
ism would change the situation "overnight." Expecting the liquidation 
of the centuries-old legacy of capitalism within a relatively short-if 
ever so eventful-period of d t i o n  reflects the attitude of socio- 
psychologism, which is as fallacious in this case as it is in others. Thus 
it is by no means an accident that those who hold the views of socio- 
psychologism are among the severest critics of thie existing socialist 
societies: censuring sharply the Soviet Union or even China for not 
having yet abolished the alienation of man, and for not having yet 
created the socialist individual. I t  hardly needs stressing that demand- 
ing such impossible changes amounts to demanding no changes at all; 
that stipulating the immediate realization of what can develop only 
slowly on the basis of vast institutional transformations as a condition 
for the participation in the struggle for a better society is tantamount 
to deserting this struggle altogether. 
A few concluding remarks: what I have said so far is not meant 
to suggest that there may be no possibility of individuals who are ill 
finding a measure of relief through currently available means of psy- 
chiatric treatment. The frequently reiterated observation that the 
degree of success attained in psychotherapy is largely independent of 
the school of psychological thought to which the therapist adheres, but 
k rather determined by the skill and personality of the physician and 
the amount of attention given by him to the patient, suggests the 
absence of any well-founded theory underlying* psychotherapeutic p~ac- 
tice. Moreover, psychotherapy's relative success in dealing with isolated 
symptoms of nervous disorder and the generally admitted failure of its 
efforts at curing character neurosis would tend to c o n f h  the earlier 
expressed view that the phenomena underlying character neurosis are 
inaccessible to treatment on the individd plane. Indeed, the insist- 
ence on the possibility of altering character structure on the individual 
plane, of "producing" a healthy, well-functioning, and happy indivi- 
dual in our society is in itself an ideology. I t  tears asunder individual 
and society, it ignores the alienation of man under capitalism, and it 
represents a capitulation to socio-psychologism. It obscures the painful 
but ineluctable truth that the limits to the cure of man's soul are set 
by the illness of the society in which he lives. 
BEYOND PSYCHOLOGY 
BY ARON KRICH 
Paul A. Baran's paper "Mandsm and Psychoanalysis" calls 
attention again to the danger of a jealously guarded and partisan 
monism. Faced with the formidable task of synthesizing two seminal 
conceptuaEzatbns of man -in society, Professor Baran atomizes 
psychoanalysis by extrapolating a theory of personality out of a 
theory of history. The result, of course, is not synthesis but an ideo- 
logicid fantasy in which depth psychology (my italics) is held to 
concern itself with "what constitutes the surface of social existencey' 
(Baran's italics), and in which abstractions like "the attained ,stage 
of the development of productive forces" are held to be of more 
concrete influence on the individual than mother love. Corollary 
contradictions, arise in embracing those theories of psychoanalysis least 
reconcilable with Marxism while castigating its complementary aspects. 
This last point best illustrates Baran's need to deny those devel- 
opments in contemporq psychology and psychoanalysis which 
threaten b.imposed "hegemony" of Marxism. Readers will r ~ a l l  that 
Baran, in renouncing "socio-psychologism" as amelioristic, suggests. 
that "only Marxism is able to fulfil the. ,taskw of "taking up Freud's 
work where Freud left it." Baran then goes on to say that it is 
"fundamental to the Marxian approach to the study of man that 
there is no such thing as an eternal, hv&t human nature." But . 
Freud never abandoned his belief that the infant comes into the 
world with an archaic phylogenetic inheritance which is active in its 
mental life. These built-in memory traces, Freud held, gave impetus, 
for example, to fears of castration as punishment for incest wishes. 
It  follows that for Freud "the fate of the Oedipus Complex'L, 
is the crucial determinant of personality in any society, no matter how 
H Aron Krich, Ed. D., is a ~ s y c h o l o g ~  in the prmte  practice of psycho- 
therapy and marriage counseling in New York City. He ir the author of the 
recently published Anatomy of Love, as well as several other books in his 
field. 
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advanced or primitive. This has remained a basic, if sometimes 
hidden, postulate of the orthodox Freudian school. Its rejection 
accounts, along with other differences too technical to outline here, 
for the rise of the so-called culturalist school of psychoanalysis, which 
Baran refers to as "socio-psychologism" and which believes-along 
with Baran-that "man is the product of the social order in which 
he is born." Yet it is just at this point in his paper that Baran decries 
their interest in society as referring "to environment, to inter-personal 
relations, and to similar aspects of what constitutes the surface of 
social existence." 
Baran achieves these stunning reversals by a device which is 
not immediately apparent in the text of a persuasive polemic. As I 
read it, I found myself puzzled at being in disagreement even while 
wanting to agree, until I realized that he was writing about a psycho- 
analysis stripped of function. The work of metapsychology is taken 
over by a "metamarxism." Nowhere in the paper is there a recognition 
of psychoanalysis as an instrument for the exploration of the inner 
processes of human personality. By the same token there is utter dis- 
regard, or ignorance, of its clinical observations. 
How else could we explain Baran's dismissal of the need for love 
as "liberal claptrap." The most convincing kind of evidence (Spitz, 
Goldfarb, Roudenlio, Bowlby and others) is now available that the 
absence of mothering care in the first year of life can lead to crip- 
pling disabilities of personality, ranging from psychopathic inability 
to give and receive love to mute autism. More recently these find- 
ings have been confirmed in the controlled laboratory setting by 
Harlow's now famous, ingenious substitution of wire and terry-cloth 
"mothers" for the real mothers of infant rhesus monkeys. Baran 
either is--or pretends to bmblivious of that part of human motiva- 
tion which is elaborated below the level of awareness in the con- 
stellation of nurture and nature. 
By eliminating the psychic backdrop against which human events 
are enacted, Baran leaves himself without a set of variables inter- 
vening between the individual and his social order. Since, according to 
Baran, the important influences on human beings do not stem from 
"environment" (i.e., the encounters from birth through maturity with 
parents, peers, and other significant people who transmit and interpret 
the social order) but from the social order itself, (i.e., "the attained 
stage of the development of productive forces, the mode and rela- 
tions of production, the form of social domination prevailing") the re- 
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action of the individual becomes undifferentiated. N e d ,  in Baran's 
sense of the word, identifies something endemic to the sick society 
and, in the analogue of physical diseare, the individual unavoidably 
"cat&es" it as from a non-filterable virus. 
Indeed, in his spoken remarks Baran declared: "NeurosiS is 
society." Strangely enough this position, if modified to read, ''Change 
society and man's difficulties in living will change," is central to much 
of contemporary psychoanalytic thought. Erich Fromm and Karen 
Homey, in particular, have alerted us to the pibilities of a double 
neurosis in which the pressures of cultural history herniate into the 
vicissitudes of personal history. The position that man is a product 
of his culture as much as his culture is a product of man is the basis 
for those occasional recommendations for new ways in c h i l d - d g ,  
education, and other human relations emanating from the move- 
ment of "socio-psychologism" which Baran considers so pwillanimous. 
Obviously some of us are more immune than others from infec- 
tion by our sick society. There is a growing body of studies on the 
epidemiology of mental illness which may ultimately reveal a noso- 
logical pattern of mental disorder by economic class, occupation, 
education, or other reality circumstances. However, all of us live 
under monopoly capitalism; but only about 15 percent of us break 
down under its pressure or are seized with its "macro-madness". The 
rest of us hang an to our culture's "mic~sense." We handle the 
stress of life in a variety of ways with varying degrees of success or 
failure. The methods we choose to use come up for examination in the 
psyclboanalytic therapies. From these we learn that the adult who is 
having neurotic .difficulties in living i s  usually suffering from an 
inability to let go of beliefa about b l f  and his world which were 
early imprinted and are no longer appropriate. Such an individual 
is not in the grip of "the form of social domination prevailing" but 
is, rather, in the toils of what Freud once called his "reminiscencess" 
of what happened in his past. 
To see the operational inutility of Baran's reductionism we need 
only look at actual clinical situations. "It is impoesiblq'' Baran 
writes, "to understand sexual malfunctioning apart from capitalism- 
caused atrophy of spontaneity." Parenthetically, one might ask Baran 
to document his assumption that sexual malfunctioning has increased 
in tbe advanced stage of monopoly capitalism over, let us say, late 
19-century burgeoning industrialism From the sparse evidence 
available it seems more likely that at least one half of the population 
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in the countries of greatest industrial development are enjoying greater 
sexual participation and response than ever before. But, again, Baran's 
reductionism leaves no leeway for the consideration of such variables 
as the accelerating emancipation of women. 
Leaving this question aside, we could reply to Baran that it is 
quits possible to u n d d  and treat sexual malfunctioning with- 
out reference to "capidkrn-caused atrophy of spontaneity." Any 
clinician could supply numenus instances of the removal of debilita- 
ting symptoms and disturbances in the sex-life without such refer- 
ence. At the risk of sounding gauche in this non-clinical publication, 
I must say that understanding a patient's masturbation fantasies may 
be nion pertinent. In the area of ' sexual behavior, Marxism has 
rather. remote heuristic value when compared to the methodology 
of psychoanalysi. 
However, if Baran intends his sweeping statement to mean that 
behavioral science must be broad enough to include all the data which 
might help us to understand the individual, then he is doing con- 
temporary psychoanalysis an injustice. On the whole, loday's thera- 
pists are alert to the multiple vectors that locate the individual in his 
social field. As a corrective to Baran's caricature of psychology as the 
"prostitute of motivation research," I offer a randomly chosen 
sample of a psychoanalytic view of the "economic" factors in neurosis. 
From a recently published statement by a spokesman for the Karen 
Horney group we hear: 
As originally pointed out, in spite of individual variations, the 
crucial conflicts around which neuroses develop are almost always 
the same. I t  is economically based in our culture on the principle 
of individual competition which generates hostilities and fears. 
Success means economic security and enhanced prestige; failure, 
less income and diminished self-esteem. With the resultant 
emotional isolation, the need for love becomes all the more intense 
and is overvalued in our culture. This-not genuine love, but an 
illusion of it-will solve all problems. Just as there are contra- 
dictory drives in neurosis, there. are false values in our culture 
which intensify the neurotics' problems. We put value on com- 
petition and success with which antithetical values of brotherly 
love and humility collide. Simultaneously, desires for more are 
stimulated through our advertising, while circumstances constant- 
ly frustrate them. We are told we are free individuals, although' 
realistically there are many factual limitations to getting what 
one Hmnts even if one is energetic and efficient. (Kellman, 
Arneriean Handbook of Psychiatry, p. 1437.) 
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is immutable. If human nature is immutable then changes in environ- 
ment are futile. 
Professor Baran attempts to escape this dilemma by positing a 
"sociology of the psyche". This means, I suppose, that individual 
psychology is held indeterminate between epochal social changes like 
that of feudalism to capitalism a ~ d ,  again, in the projected leap 
from capitalism to socia1ism. What happens to human motivation in 
the interval is rejected as spuriously concrete and ahistorical "socio- 
psychologism". In this paradigm of wishful thinking, psychology is 
by-passed and with it the possibility for genuine understanding of 
how the nature of man changes while he changes his society. 
THE CONFLICT WITHIN 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 
BY N. S .  LEHRMAN, M.-D. 
Professor Baran's distinguished p a p  on "Marxisrn and Psy&o- 
analysis'' in the O c t k  issue of MONTHLY REVIEW, is a wklcome 
advance in Mamist thinking. It points out the fundamental difference 
in approach between Freud and Marx, rather than prating about non- 
existent differences between Freud and Pavlov. The basic truth which 
Baran points out moat clearly once again is the fundamental fact that 
M d s  sociological explanations of psychology are far more accurate 
and far more useful than Freud's biopsychological explanations of 
sociology. 
Having made this point, however, Baran does not dip and throw 
the Freudian baby out with the bathwater. H e  reco&&s the import- 
ance, as many Marxists have not, of separating that which is true 
and useful in Freud's work from its mystical, unscientific core. To 
follow Baran still further, I think we must do with Freud what Marx 
did with the mystical Hegel: not discard him but, in a sense, stand 
him on his feet. I believe this task is in process of being accomplished. 
The key to this problem, as I see it, is the scientific recognition and 
undentanding of the importance of human feelings as signals. Pav- 
lovian~ have recognized the importance of verbal signah, but have 
tended to mkhize  the significance of emotions. Freudians, correctly 
recognizing the importance of human feelings, have incorrectly seen 
them as determined ultimately by inner biological reality rather than 
by outer social reality. A correct synthesis of the two points of view 
is by no means impossible. 
Three Specific Criticisms 
There are three aspects of Baran's paper, however, to which I 
beliwe valid exception can be taken. 
Dr. Lehrman, a Psychoanalyst practicing in Great Neck, Long Xslttnd, 
is Visiting Lecturer at the Post-Graduate Center for Psychotherepy, New York 
City. 
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(1) While I think he is correct in criticizing 'csocio-psycholog- 
ism", it seems to me that he does not sufficiently recognize the 
correct direction this movement has taken, even though it has as yet 
not gone far enough. To present "socio-psychologism" solely as a 
"concession" is incorrect1y to imply that there is a mastermind within 
the field of psychoandysis from whom scientific advance is reluct- 
antly extracted. I do not think there is any such mastermind, 
although perhaps some psychoanalyst members of the Guild of 
Catholic Psychiatrists might like to take on this function. 
Because "mental health" has so far been presented only in terms 
of family and other soupy "togetherness" does not mean that the 
concept can go no further. True mental health can only be achieved 
under socialism, in which man's exploitation of man, and man's 
consequent inhumanity to man, have been ended. 
(2) Baran's discussion of man's "alienation from himself' also 
has a rather vague and fuzzy flavor. I am not quite sure what he 
means-and this is unusual in so precise and meticulous a thinker 
as Baran. Perhaps he is referring to the ever-widening gap between 
the actual achievements of the individuals in our society and their 
ever-increasing potentials. If so, greater precision in his paper might 
have been in order. 
(3) Baran seems to overstress the importance of spontaneity and 
emotionality in his basically correct criticism of the "men of measured 
merriment" of our times. This overstress can lead to a worship of 
impulse and feelings, at the expense of thought and consciousness. 
Freudians have attempted, in the most unscientific way possible, to 
separate thinking from feeling, and it is a little surprising to find 
Baran apparently tending to do the same. Thought and feeling are 
two aspects of the same process Sir Charles Sherrington, the brilliant 
British Nobel laureate in neurophysiology, pointed out long ago that 
"every cognition has, pot en tially at least, an emotive value." This 
inextricability of thinking and feeling is most clearly described in 
V. J. McGill's fine little book, Emotions and Reason. 
What Psychoanalysis Can Do 
Unlike Baran, I write as a professional in the field of psycho- 
analysis. In my opinion, psychoanalysis is one of the most potent 
tools that have existed in the medico-ideological armamentarium. 
Provided that a person's basic economic needs are met-and they 
usually are in the people who can afford the treatment-psycho- 
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analysis can often truly throw open the door of happiness and useful- 
ness to suffering people. It can do so by giving them a clearer under- 
standing of themselves in relationship to the world about them-to 
their families and to their society--by helping them to understand 
and to change their own incorrect responses. It cam do so by helping 
people to understand their own feelings, the signals to their con- 
sciousness arising from their present and past experience, and by 
aiding them to understand the extent to which these feeling-signals 
are accurate, and to what extent they are not. 
I have seen desperate, panicked people returned to usefulness, 
health, and courage through psychoanalytic treatment. I have seen 
disintegrating families, filled with acrimony, restored to warmth, 
happiness, and effectiveness through psychoanalytic treatment . I 
have seen cowardly people become courageous, and terrified people 
become calm, again through psychoanalytic treatment. Properly ap- 
plied, by a courageous psychoanalyst with an accurate perception of 
the world in which he lives, psychoanalysis can, even at this moment, 
after certain important technical changes, be a most mighty boon 
to many of the suffering Americans who can afford it. 
The effectiveness of psychoanalysis is, however, limited by the 
society within whidh it exists. The extent to which any person can be 
helped cannot, in the long run, extend beyond limits set by the 
contradictions and opportunities of the society he lives in. But, on the 
basis-of what I have seen, I firmly believe that psychoanalysis can 
help people to see reality more clearly, so that they can help to 
*mprove the world, and even to enjoy it in the process. 
(-7 -- 
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What Psychoarialysis Has Done 
The potentialities of psychoanalysis for assisting human advance- r l  
ment are tremendous. So are the potentialities of nuclear energy. In 
both cases, I am referring to what might be done with the valuable I, 
ideas, techniques, and ideology, after elimination of the anti-human 4 
and unscientific elements. 
But the overall result of psychoanalysis, like - that of nuclear 
energy, has been basically anti-human so far, it seems to me. It has 
had a profoundly destructive effect on human thinking, despite the 
assistance it has undoubtedly rendered to many individuals. Psycho- 
analysis is potent. It is potent in helping people to feel and function # 
better, but it is also potent in making people worse. I 
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The harmful therapeutic effect which psychoanalysis often has 
is frequently hidden by analysts' tendencies to blame the patient if 
he is more disturbed after treatment than before. "He must have been 
schizophrenic," they say, making a mystical, Kantian Ding an sich 
of this vague "disease." 
But if psychoanalysts take credit for helping some of their 
patients, and they rightfully do, they must also take blame for harm- 
ing others. In my own practice, for example, I find that the most 
difficult patients to treat are those who have failed with other 
therapists. In these situations, it is harder to undo the harm which 
the previous treatment has caused than it is to treat people who 
have not had the dubious benefits of such unsuccessful treatment. 
Many private psychiatric hospitals have large numbers of patients 
who became worse in office psychoanalytic, or psychoanalytically 
oriented, treatment. The state hospitals know full well the glib 
excuses for uselessness and irrational behavior presented on admission 
by "graduates" of some of the psychoanalytically-oriented hospitals. 
These people are worse after treatment than before, so we must 
conclude the treatment harmed them. 
The Pernicious Social and Political Effects of Psychoanalysis 
From the social and political point of view, the overall results 
of psychoanalysis have been far more pernicious, I believe, than 
even Baran realizes. As often practiced, psychoanalysis is the most 
potent method yet devised for paralyzing the radical intellectual, and 
the Jewish radical in particular. Tensions, particularly of a racist 
kind, fill the air of our country, and vague, covert threats impinge 
on people these days, particularly when they begin to become political- 
ly active. The result is fear and anxiety. 
There remains little political organization to provide solidarity 
and emotional support for such individuals. Indeed, many Left 
organizations seem so frightened that they tend to extrude the mem- 
ber who becomes uneasy. When in trouble, people no longer go to 
the rabbis and ministers for help and courage. Failing to realize that 
they are responding to the stimuli of a pervasively contradictory and 
threatening society, they consider themselves "disturbed" and seek 
psychoanalytic, or psychotherapeutic, help. 
The analyst, "high in a tower up a chamber to the east," doubts 
the existence of harassment in the present, suspects the patient's 
reaction is "paranoid" and assumes that the roots of the fears of the 
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~ ' A m o q W p  cind a d p a t i m t ~ g o t o w a t  
examhing the h t t d s  c h i l d h d  
The paralytic effectiveness of the tmatmmt is marrimiEed by the 
fhct'that both the patient and the d y s t  &ly beliewe the treat- 
ih&t to be dfica~ious and scientific ?;hir'belief is mhanmd by the 
firct-that the treatment is sometimes accompanied by riiminiahcd di& 
d b r t ,  prtic&lY if politid actiirity, and consequent h d e n t ,  
' i l ' k m ~ u d .  
And while the patient searches his pact, the world gws oa &ad 
oppsrtunitks an missed. ' I have often wondered what the role of the 
'@%&hbg &rh Psychoanalytic Institute was in 1932 and 1933, 
&i& particular reference to the paralysis of intellectuals of the 
!!kx&$t Democratic Party. 
- \  . 
' I ,  - . . , @  .The political effect of psychoanalysis has all too often been a 
i.&ad~tion ,of proerasthation for courage. ''Contemporary m o d e '  
in)&odyst  Allen Wheelis writes, "often put their backs to the 
couch, and in so doing may fail to put their shoulders to the wheel." 
This is the resulti) w Barm notes, of accepting a most changeable 
Wty y., &&qngeablc, aqd leads to submission and conformity, 
t+tbu ' >  &pl io change and creativity. 
Search versus Dogma in Psychoanalysis 
Within psychoanalysis3 as in all other parts of ideology, a struggle 
is going on between scientific search and mystical dogma. Within the 
field itself, even today, increasing numbers of psychoanalysts are 
rejecting the biopsychological dogma of Freud. It does not work. 
Instead, they are searching out new and useful truths in the nature 
of the society. 
While, as Baran points out, these psychologico-social trends still 
fall short of the truth, they do represent movement in a progressive 
direction within the field. They indicate a change toward increased 
recognition of the still basically unrecognized primacy of societal 
factors in molding our biological clay. It depends on Marxists, in the 
field and outside it, to point out that the essential "societal factor" 
which must be seen and changed is the existence of class 'contradic- 
tions within our society, contradictions which can be resolved only, 
so far as I am concerned, by a peaceful transfer of power from the 
CO'NFLICT W I T H I N  P S Y C H O A N A L Y S I S  
"elite" to. the people, -through extmuicm .of Arne- p0lieica.l 
danocracy into the economic field as well. 
Search versus Dogma in Marxism 
The struggle between search and dogma is not limited to psycho- 
analysis, however. It exists in the field of Marxism as well. Many 
prewiously accepted concepts may require corntion and wen-to 
use a dirty word-"revision." Science, after all, revises its concep- 
tualizations when formerly useful ideas become a drag; isn't M m -  
ism also a scie31..ce? 
One important area where Marxist binking might warrant re 
examination i s  its tendency to damn the entire bourgeoisie. Psycho- 
analysis, an important ideology of the bourgeoisie, reflects both its 
healthy and unhealthy trends. There is a tradition of political and 
scientific democracy deeply rooted in both the American bourgeoisie 
and American psychoanalysis. I t  was this democratic tradition in the 
bourgeoisis itself which drove back McCarthy, despite the sig-nal 
absence of effective help from labor or the Left. 
A fundamental conflict exists within the ideology of the American 
bourgeoisie. On the one hand, there is the tradition of freedom of 
peaceful dissent, which partly underlies America's previously un- 
matched technological progress, and from which emerged John 
Dewey's pragmatic philosophy. On the other hand, the& is the fact ' 
of oligarchic economic control, with its ideological derivations of 
"elitism" and obscurantism. This conflict exists in the minds of wexy 
bourgeois, even those named Rockefeller and Stevenson. 
Since there are such constructive, honest, democratic trends within 
bourgeois ideology, it appears that it might be worth while to work 
openly and honestly with the bourgeoisie. Such honest intellectual 
interaction is far more desirable than renouncing the constructive 
influence we can have on the bourgeoisie, and leaving the ideological 
field to Roman Catholic dogma and elite fascism. 
Search versus Dogma in Religion 
The struggle between scientific search and mysterious dogma 
exists in the much neglected and oft-maligned field of religion as 
well. The mainstreams of American Protestantism and Judaism 
today emphasize search-the search of each man for his own God, 
the attempt of each individual to realize his own potentialities. The 
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monolithic Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, resembles 
much of the contemporary American psychoanalysis, insofar as both 
emphasize submission to dogma. The former kneels while the latter 
lies, each passively accepting what is presented as the doctrine of 
a great Jew. 
Psychoanalysis, the ideology of the bourgeoisie, reflects both 
the scientific and dogmatic aspects of the class from which it comes. 
It, like the bourgeoisie, should be dealt with openly, peacefully, and 
scientifically, so as to retain that which is good and useful, without 
keeping the dead and dogmatic. Precision, rather than large 
emptiness, is the halhaxk of science. Let us therefore be careful 
not to throw the baby out with the bath water-whether the baby 
be Freudian or bourgeois. 
NEED NOT WAIT .  
BY PETER B .  NEUBAUER,  M.D. 
Professor Baran hai given his article a misleading title and it 
is therefore difficult to discuss it. A careful outline of the theoretical 
propositions of both Marxism and psychoanalysis must be the basis 
of7any investigation. Only then will it be possible to come to specific 
conclusions and to answer the important questions: To what degree 
may a science present a true advance but still be misused by present 
conditions of the social order? To what degree is it itself a reflection 
of these social conditions? 
Psychoanalysis would have to be discussed as a theory of the 
psychology and psychopathology of man, as a technique of treatment 
and as a tool for research. Similarly one would need an outline of 
7, the propositions of a Marxist psychology, or at least to apply con. 
sistently the principles of dialectical materialism to the clinical data 
in order to evolve such a psychology. 
Baran is interested in the "social" aspects of Marxian psychology, 
and he refers to psychoanalysis only to the degree that it has refer- 
ence to social conflicts. But psychic life can be understood only in its 
continuous interplay with biologic and social conditions. It is more 
than their simple reflection. It follows its own laws and its own 
mechanisms. The great achievement of psychoinalysis is based on 
Freud's freeing of psychology from the tradition of his time, which 
had reduced it to biological laws and to the function of the central 
nervous system. There is a similar danger today in the assumption that 
by knowing social laws and conflicts one thereby also understands 
psychic conflicts. 
If Baran had been content to discuss the social frame of refer- 
ence within which the individual functions, he would have given us 
an important outline. But he went far beyond this and thereby, as I 
shall try to show, ends up with an anti-psychologic position. 
Dr. Neubauer is a meem.ber of the American Psychoanalytic Associa;tion 
und Director of the Child Development Center in New York. 
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He doep not refer once to psychic processes, to the developmental 
organization, to the symbolic rep-tation of the outside world, to 
the role of memory, of fantasy and thought processeq neither as a 
Marxian psychology would present them, nor a9 psych~alysis does. 
We can easily agree with him when he speaks about the dangem 
of viewing man too much from the individual point of view, which 
leads to the opposite mistake, namely, to the psychologizing of 
Baran has eloquently presented an outline of social conflicts m 
a capitahtic society. He stresses the increase of irrationality of our 
d order enforced by competition and the drive for profits. This 
in turn becomes an obstacle t o  human development, leading to an 
impairment of the spontaneity in man. Social conflicts have a direct 
and immediate bearing in certain areas of our interest: (1) for the 
understanding of whatever comprises mental health in the com- 
munity; (2) for the purpose of prevention of emotional disorders; 
and (3) in order to assess the interplay between the social and 
neurotic conflict. This is to say, for an understanding of how 
individual psychological conflict can be reinforced or even exploited 
by social conditions. But this is insufficient to permit us to accept his 
definition of neurosis-that it is the irrational reaction to a 
pdcious social order-nor does it explain his finding that imtion- 
ality. and aggressiveness in man are a refusal to accept capitalism. 
When we explore the causes of, let us say, a phobia, our patients 
do not inform us that their central conflict stems from their relation- 
ship to social institutions or from their role in connection with the 
means of production. We have learned that each step in hu~lan 
development is influenced by the human example others give, by the 
quality of this relationship. From the study of children we have 
learned to raise these questions: What has happened to the child, 
by whom, when did it happen in his development, and what are the 
specific citlrructeristks of this child? Unless we have the answers to 
these four factors in each individual life history, we are not able to 
understand a child's psychic life. It is true that the parents are 
exposed to social conditions, are influenced by them, and transmit 
them to the child. But again, the transmission is not a simple reflec- 
tion. The parents, too, transform their social experience through their 
psychic organization, their degree of understanding or rationality, 
their degree of maturity. We are forced to explore each individual's 
own life history and we are happy to say that we have such an 
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Individual Psychology today. While there is danger of over-empha- 
sizing the individual, there is also the possibility of giving the 
individual unlimited attention. 
We find that certain specific events and experiences within this 
relationship can lead to an arrest of further development, and that 
these patients then repeat over and over again their early pattern, 
which has become partially independent of changes in their environ- 
ment. Our patients have lost the freedom to change with changing 
circumstances. Even if them should be a vast improvement in the 
social order, they would be bound to the old because psychic enslave- 
ment does not permit a free interaction between the individual and 
his environment. 
These important processes take place within the family. The 
concept of a psychological environment is significantly not acceptable 
to Bsran because it does not stand for society at large. But we need a 
concept which refers to that part of society to which an individual 
has a significant emotional relationship, namely, his environment. The 
role of the family as a bridge between the individual and social 
organization is psychologically of utmost importance. When damage 
has been done to a child within the family, so that neurotic conflict 
has emerged, the stepping out of the child into society will have only 
a secondary modifying influence on his further development. The 
extra-familial experience may ameliorate or reinforce the original 
problem, but we cannot regard it as the direct cause. The family has 
the capacity to protect the individual from the pathological influences 
of the social order, or the family may be the seat of such disturbances 
as to be responsible for much more serious pathology than is gen- 
erally found in the community. 
The capacity to love, to understand, and to reach maturity varies 
from individual to individual in each society. We have to emphasize 
these differences, for they alone permit us to understand why some of 
our patients suffer from phobias and others from depression, why 
some from an inhibition of sexual function, others from a perversion, 
why some are addicted to alcohol and others to success or to failure 
in the same mciety. This is the main interest of psychopathology. 
Statements by BaFan that our capitalist society is responsible for 
sexual inhibition present a generalization beyond reason. Have these 
disturbances not occurred in other societies and isn't it true that 
we find not only inhibition but also the opposite-selfish indulgence 
with insufficient controls? 
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If we are not interested in studying the individual life history, 
the phases of psychological development which are particularly 
vulnerable to certain influences, the talents of each individual, his 
capacity to submit to present conditions or to transcend them, then 
we do not have a psychology. It  is for this reason that Baran has not 
discussed any of the contributions which psychoanalysis has made to 
an understanding of these essential variables, and we therefore have 
no basis for discussing the correctness of this part of psychoanalytic 
theory. Without such an individual psychology, Baran arrives at 
the conclusion that "the insistence on the possibility of altering 
character structure on the individual plane is in itself an ideology," 
and that "the limits to the cure of man's soul are set by the illness of 
the society in which he lives." Such a formulation does not take 
into account the contradictions in each social and individual organ- 
ization, the endless attempt of man to master nature, to change him- 
self, and to substitute rationality for irrationality. As Freud has 
stated it, where there is id there shall be ego. 
I t  is possible to learn about those psychological processes which 
arrest development and set off a neurotic repetition of conflict. It  
is possible to develop techniques to free the individual from such inner 
enslavement. I t  is possible to use professional skill and the continuous 
effort of one individual to help another individual free himself from 
internal and external restrictions. 
I t  is true, however, that there are psychiatric disorders which are 
often less responsive to our intervention. If Baran had been satisfied, 
as he said he would be, to outline a sociology of the psyche, he would 
have made it easier for us to study his findings with the care which 
they deserve, but he drew conclusions which attempt to explain 
psychopathology while neglecting psychological processes and neglect- 
ing the individual, and therefore he has fallen prey to some errors 
he criticizes in others. Even when man shall have mastered society 
in such a way that its resources will be sufficient "to give to each 
according to his needs," we will still have need of a science of the 
individual and his inner life. In the meantime we can do better than 
just wait. 
TWO RECENT MARXIST VIEWS 
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 
BY NORMAN REIDER, M.D. 
Soviet Survey, a London quarterly devoted to providing facts 
and analyses of the Soviet Union, presents in its issue for July- 
September, 1959, an account of a special conference called on the 
initiative of the Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the 
USSR for the purpose of discussing the problems of ideological 
struggle with modern Freudianism. The account was written by P. P. 
Bundarenko and M. Kh. Rabinovich and originally appeared in 
Voprosy Filosofii, February, 1959. According to the editors of Soviet 
Survey, this document is of particular interest because it represents 
a new line in Soviet psychology and not just the view of an individual 
writer. This new line, they say, is much better informed and much 
more sophisticated than the official line of ten or even five years ago, 
and the conference in question dealt with problems which previously 
would have been ignored as wholly irrelevant. 
The implication in the title of the conference that there is 
something modem about Freudianism is a promising beginning, but 
unfortunately the promise is not fulfilled. An introductory speech by 
Professor S. A. Smkisov holds that bourgeois countries have accepted 
Freud's theory that the basic forces determining human behavior are 
unconscious biological instincts originating in the sexual experiences 
of infancy. This unfortunate kind of inaccuracy characterizes a great 
deal of the document, which deals heavily in criticism of Freudians 
who use psychoanalytic methods "to mislead and pacify the workers." 
Many of the speeches that follow are clearly not scientific discussions 
but polemics against the imputed political implication of Freudianism. 
This pattern is sustained by F. V. Basin, who attacks the sacio- 
logical applications of psychoanalytic theory. What is significant in 
this paper is the repeated statement that attempts to reconcile Freud- 
Dr. Reider is Senior ChiGf of Psychiatry, Mount Zion Hosfiital, San 
Francisco, and an instructor in the San Francisco Psychoanalytical Institute. 
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ian and Paviovias theories must be fought. Howeva, a cogent 
remark is made in the statement that Freud's error lay not in the 
fact that he gave much attention to the problem of conflict, but in 
his mneous formulation of the problem. Freud is o b v i d y  not 
forgiven for having deserted the field of neuropathollogy, since '%e 
renounced the study of neurosis as a consequence of disturbance of 
the normal 'interrelation of nervous procebsu and adopted 'a ptb 
of subjective idealism." Then is a still further yielding in this 
critique of Freud in the acknowledgmmt that an impulse behind a 
particular action can influence behavior despite its being unwdous. 
Even though Bassin states that this hypothesis is given a mystid 
interpretation by F& and that Pavlds explanations are mare 
scientific, it is nevertheless a distinct change for the official attitude 
to concede even this much in regard to the forces of the u n c d 0 1 ~ .  
On the whole, however, it is clear that for the most part the Soviets 
still consider psychoIogy scientific d y  when it is neurophysiology. 
This concession Bassin negates in the rest of his paper. He poses 
to Freudians the following question: "How can the Oedipus complex 
occur in children fed artificially and not fmm the mothas breast?.' 
'What happened to the Oedipus complex in the m a t r i d  period, 
when children did not know their own fathers?" "What ,+ppens 
when children are brought up from infancy in orphanages?" He 
stateJ further, u'I?hese simple questions prmnd fatal to the F~eudkm 
and to this day they are powerless to answer them, since the facts 
refute their attempt to reply from F r e u k  podtiom.'' The truth is 
that these excellent questions have been considered and investigated 
by many psychoandysts. For example, Anna Fmd's aad Dorothy 
B w ~ a m 9 s  Infants Without Fmniligs published in 1944, presents 
same fascinating data on one of the questions. Such invatigatiom 
have not proved fatal to p s y c ~ l y s i s  but on the contrary have 
fostered the growth of its theory and praCtia. 
A paper by Dr. No G. Gartshtein is primarily noteworthy for 
attacking two articles that had been printed previously m the 
MONTHLY RBVEw by Dr. Lawrence Kubie (March 1958) and by 
maelf (December 1957), the latter a reply to Dr. D. Fedotor?~ 
"The Soviet View of Psychoanalysis" which appeared in MR, 
December 1957. There is nothing new in this paper. I am quoted as 
saying. that Freud and his followers discwered an objective method 
for the investigation of the brain, a remark which is held by Gartsh- 
tein to be completely unfounded. I agree. Moreover, I never made 
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any such statement, which an examination of the original article (p. 
61) will show. Translations from one language to another are oc- 
casional~ inaccurate. But this sort of knocking down of straw men is 
symptomatic of an over-defensiveness which would not need to be 
resorted to if the Soviet official position were sound scientifically. 
In my opinion the most significant part of this symposium 
is contributed by Dr. P. K. Anokhin, who draws attention to the 
need of a more profound and more concrete approach to Freudism 
without over-simplification of Freudian views. The two most sub- 
stantial remarks by Anokhin are: (1) "It was necessary to put 
forward opposing scientific-materialistic data to explain those com- 
plex intimate questions which Freudism has monopolized, trying to 
give them its own interpretation. I t  must be remembered that Freud- 
ism has not remained constant; it has changed, and its arguments 
have changed also. It cannot be said that Freudism ignores social 
phenomena; it distorts their nature and gives an incorrect explanation 
of people's behavior." (2) "It was necessary to squeeze Freudism out 
of those scientific fields which it was trying to exploit for reactionary 
ends, and to give a scientific-materialistic explanation of psychological 
phenomena." The rest of the symposium is largely repetitious by 
way of criticism of Freudian theory-particularly with relation to 
dreams and psychosomatic medicine-and its application to sociology. 
All this is old stuff except for the bit of yielding as to (1) the 
importance of the unconscious in human motivation, (2) the admis- 
sion that Freudian theory has been over-simplified, and (3) the 
suggestion that its subject matter and content must be taken over by 
the Pavlovians. This acknowledgement of the importance of the 
content of psychological data, which has hitherto been ignored as a 
kind of epiphenomenon, is in a sense new; but in the main, the anti- 
Freudian arguments are old, largely polernic, and are based upon 
incomplete appreciation of Freud's libido theory. For the most part 
these critics continue the argument as if Freud had written nothing 
since 1914 except the death instinct theory. The great advances that 
have been made in ego psychology are ignored. Thus the promise of 
a "new look" is disappointing. 
A second contribution appeared in the October 1959 issue of 
MONTHLY REVIEW by Dr. Paul A. Baran on "Marxism and Psycho- 
analysis." This is a much more urbane, sophisticated, and knowledge- 
able approach to the subject than that of the Soviet scientists. It  is 
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tefreshkg to find that an econormst lue Baran has a better insight 
into psychological processes than the Russian writers, who are so 
steeped in the neurophysiological approaeh inherent in Pavlov. Baran 
perceives something new on the horizon, a sort of amalgam of psycho- 
analysis with some quasi-Marxian sociological notions. This doctrine, 
which he calls 'csocio-psychologism," holds that man is influ 
by society, while equating "society" to the environment. 
Let us follow Baran in what he considers the implications 
socio-psychologism. First, he disposes of the theory that since human 
nature determines the historical process and since human nature is 
unalterable, all attempts to transform society are doomed. In contrast, 
socio-psychologism holds that human development is determin 
the social milieu, or the nature of interpersonal relationships, 
which it follows that improvements can be made by suitable "adjust- / # 
ments" in the prevailing environment. Socio-psychologism, according 
to' Baran, uncovers horrors in our culture and therefore is nearer 
to the realities of capitalism, but it proceeds to blame our difficulties ' 
on our own inefficiencies and refuses to see the fundamental causes I 
of bur problems in the very nature of capitalism itself. Baran holds : 
that Marxists are in error in combating such new versions of the # '  
psychological approach by means of their old arguments, and that , 
it is a mistake not to extract what is good from socio-psychologism, 
' 
, 
"whatever genuine insights may be submerged'' in this new approach. ! 
'13axanys arguments are incisive, at times witty, at times sarcastic, 
and at tiines erroneous. But as I indicated above, it is decidedly 
refreshing to find a Marxist who does not hold that all of Freud is 
bunk. Barmi acknowledges that Freud directed his studies to a 
rational understanding of the irrational motivations in man. Where 
Freud goes wrong in his view, is not in his aim h t  in holdingthat 
human nature is invariable. Baran believes that changes have taken 
place in "human nature," for example, an increase in rationality 
with changes in the methods of production. This has caused a chanp 
in the mental habits of man. Baran's meaning is not entirely clear 
here, but I take it that he means that magical thinking plays a smaller 
role in the mental processes of man than previously. 
Baran's thesis holds that the alienation of man from his means 1 
of production leads to the madness of our economic system, which in 4 
turn leads to the alienation of man from himself. Under such circum- 1 
stances, human rationality becomes crippled and bears no relation- 
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ship to the prerequisites for and the needs of human health, happiness, 
and development. Another way of stating his thesis leads to the 
conclusion that the conflict between "partial rationality" and "total 
rationality" leads to man's psychological aberrations. 
Baran concludes that irrationality in our times is not a develop- 
ment from unalterable human instincts, but rather that advances in 
capitalism have led to a radical subjugation of the nature of man 
himself. Whereas previously violence was used by the ruling class 
to keep the workers down, now the capitalist enforces a subtler 
"adjustment." Now the worker has become a more diligent, docile, 
efficient, and reliable worker, but a high price has been paid in the 
loss of spontaneity. Again Baran's superior approach leads him to 
say, in contrast to the Russians quoted above, that he does not think 
this is a plot on the part of capitalists to turn workers into "diligent, 
docile, efficient, and reliable workers," but that this trend derives 
from an inherent characteristic of a mode of production which is 
based upon commodity exchange. 
Baran's thoughts lead him to make an almost heretical remark 
that Marx, Engels, and Freud all strove towards the same goal: to 
increase human happiness via freedom of individual development and 
the capacity to experience sensual gratifications. However, he holds 
that under capitalism aggression is so disciplined and channeled 
toward the attainment of success that it leads to what Freud called 
the "alienation of man from himself." Therefore, according to 
Baran, the only change that is possible in man must come as a 
result of a change in the framework of his socio-economic condition. 
Baran's ideas, which I have of course abbreviated, are superior 
to the neurophysiological approach of the Russians in holding that 
at least there are innate biologically determined drives that do play 
a role in psychic development. However, he stumbles on the old 
anti-Freudian dogma that human nature is unalterable and that all 
attempts to transform human character are therefore doomed. If the 
innate biologically-determined, instinctual drives have shown a certain 
fixity, it does not follow that their derivatives cannot change. As a 
matter of fact, it is the effort to understand the very effects of 
all sorts of forces on the innate structure which constitutes one of 
the major objectives of psychoanalytic study. Moreover, Baran's 
argument falls back on an old saw, namely, that treatment of emotion- 
al disturbances invariably tends to take the fight out of an individual 
and make him adjust to his environment. 
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B m ' s  psychdogid contribution lies in his belief that human 
nature has changed, ss d e n 4  by an increase in man's rationality 
as methods of &ductim have progressed, and that this pogres~ 
has produced changes in the mental habits of man. This interesting 
thesis is a simplified attempt to account for whatever changes have 
taken place in the coiuae of man's historical development. To attempt 
to cover this subject would necessitate an extremely long exposition, 
and I shall therefore restrict myself to only one pint.  Baran seems 
to ignore! that rhere is onto-genetic development of the psyche, which 
is of necessity a very slow procerr. Fmm a condition in which magical 
thinLing holds -7 the& gradually develops a variety of educatik 
pmesses which lead to rational thinking. Moreover, there are forms 
of magical infantile thinking that remain throughout each individual's 
life. If this kind of magical thinking is what Baran means by "human 
nature))' then I hold that it is likely to remain unchanged so long as 
man exists on this planet. If the Marxist ideal is the production of 
infants who are born with a perceptual, discriminative, and executive 
psychical apparatus that can at birth distinguish between Mozart 
and boogie-woogie and have a knowledge of the calculus and the 
Bill of Rights, I hold that this is a form of sheer irresponsible qealism 
which is being foisted on the masses as one of the new tranquilizers. 
Further, by putting emphasis upon rationality versus irrationality, 
Baran misses the point of the difference between emotional life and 
intellectttal life. The relationship between the two is a most interesting 
area of study, but the equation of rationality and healthy emotional 
life, implying as it does that the healthy human being must be 
an intellectual, is taking for granted much more than there is any 
warrant for in Baran's argument. , 
In our present social structure there is much to foster irrational 
drives toward success and a sadistic type of competitive life. I t  draws 
out much of what is aggressive in ourselves and distorts love relation- 
ships, affection, mutual respect, and cooperation. But to suggest that 
a socialist transformation of the socio-economic structure will per se 
make for major changes in hunian nature and in the human psyche3 
though a consummation apparently to be wished, is, to use Baran's 
own phrase, "claptrap." Nor can Baran take refuge in the argument, 
which he implies, that whatever defects exist in present-day socialist 
societies are vestiges of the capitalist order. A +ser interpretation; is 
one suggested by Engels, that. under socialism man would cease 
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suffering like an animal and begin to suffer like a human being. But 
Baran's fatering of the thesis that economic changes in t h d v e s  
will resolve human problems is a form of sheer irresponsibility. 
- 
If Baran really believar that his thesis is scientific and not merely 
an article of faith, then he should be able to demonstrate hav a 
psychological system b d  on J h h x k t  could step by step indicate 
how economic Changes would influence cultura.l patterm, whieh in 
turn would influence the family structure, which in turn would 
influence interpersonal relationships, which in tum would influace 
psychodynamic mechanisms and psychic development. Any systematic 
attempt to explain what Baran holds as his h i S  need not follow 
exactly the above fornula, to be sure, but at least it should avoid 
the mythological monstrosity that methods of production have a 
direct effect upon the human psyche. Even the followem of Pavlov 
would not hold that changes in the methods of production cause 
directly observable changes in patterns of cerebral-neuronal activity. 
This even they would recognize as pseudo-Marxism. 
Dialectical materialism in psychology should be able to propose 
(1) a systematic theory of the development of the psyche, which 
would serve as a basis for some sort of study of biologically determined 
drives and their vicissitudes under different conditions; (2) a theory 
of symptom-formation; and (3) a theory of treatment. At present 
the official Soviet position has, at best, no theory of psychic develop 
ment (a remarkable thing in view of the emphasis of M d t s  on 
the historical approach) ; a neurophysiological theory of symptom- 
formation which is detached from emotional problems as such and 
considers the content of symptoms as meaningless waste products; 
and a chaotic theory of treatment made up of a conglomerate of 
biochemical, neurophysiological, and social elements, all essentially 
doctrine-oriented rather than individual-oriented. 
Two encouraging signs in regard to the problem of Manrirm and 
Freudism do exist. One I pointed out in my earlier article in MR 
(December, 1957) in which I stated that there were many things 
incomplete and possibly inaccurate in psychoanalytic theory and 
practice, but they were none of the items that are stressed in the Soviet 
critiques. Psychoanalytic theory and practice are constantly being 
revised in the light of new findings in experimental and clinical fields, 
and the best place to find these changes is in the psychoanalytic 
journals themselves. They illustrate that psychoanalysts are self- 
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critical. The second sign is one that I picked up from listening to 
American psychiatrists who have spent time recently in visits to 
psychiatric facilities in the USSR. In spite of official attitudes, when 
these psychiatrists have discussed clinical material (and not theory) 
with Soviet colleagues they found in the more advanced clinical 
centers little reliance upon official theory, but a reliance upon an 
understanding of psychodynamics and a growing clinical experience 
which is essentially sound from the American observers' point of view. 
This is not the first time that theory and practice have not gone 
hand in hand, and is illustrative of something that has been frequently 
pointed out: that sooner or later if one attempts to treat individuals 
he must perforce come in contact with and treat patients via a 
dynamic psychotherapy; he must perforce come to the utilization of 
Freudian concepts whether he acknowledges them or not. 
REPLY 
BY P A U L  A .  BA-RAN 
Although differing among themselves in emphasis and detail, the, 
preceding observations on my lecture ccMarxism and Psychoanalysis" 
center on three broad issues. First, the scope of the human predica- 
ment in our society; seccmd, the causes of the prevailing condition; 
and third, the extent to which currently practiced psychotherapy 
may be able to cure individuals seeking its help. While it would far 
transcend my competence to attempt to ''cover" even approximately 
such formidable ground, I will try a necessarily brief summary of 
my principal reflections on the views advanced by my critics. 
The first issue is raised most explicity by Dr. Krich. "All of us," 
he writes, "live under monopoly capitalism, but only 15 percent of 
us break down under its pressure or are seized with its 'macro- 
madness.' The rest of us hang on to our culture's 'microsense."' 
This statement reveals, I submit, that its author missed not only the 
point of my lecture but, what is much more serious, he has missed 
the intent and content of the theoretical work of both Marx and 
Freud. For neither Marx's sociology nor Freud's psychology is con- 
cerned solely or even primarily with social and psychic pathology, 
with pronounced, diagnostically identifiable social or psychic illness 
calling for specific, pragmatic therapy. At least in this regard Mam 
and Freud were treading on the same ground. Both were seeking 
to comprehend the visible pathological excrescences of social exist- 
ence in their relation to the "statistical norm," to discern in the 
condensed, one might say exaggerated, manifestation of suffering the 
less intense but universal malaise hidden beneath the relatively calm 
surface of everyman's everyday life. Treating these excrescences as 
"deplorable exceptions" that have to be explained, and if possible 
cured, may well be a legitimate preoccupation of what Krich com- 
mends as "clinical empiricism," but it is certainly not conducive 
to insight into the fundamental problem involved. Indeed, far 
from referring exclusively to the "15 percent of us [who] break 
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down," the problem is precisely the nature of the culture to which 
the 85 percent "hang an"-the culture that produces the more or 
less violent breakdown of the "only" 15 percent, and the moro or 
less supportable mk4re psychologique (Freud) of the 85 percent. 
This is not the place to attempt a description of this culture or to 
detail its repressive, irrational, neurosh-breeding characteristics. 
Some of the relevant consideratione were indicated briefly in my 
lecture and there is abundant material on this subject in the 
sociological and psychological literature. Whether we examine the 
gerieral cultural standards of our society or the prevailing state of 
education, whether we consider race relations or juvenile delinquency, 
whether we think about the increasingly pronounced breakdown of 
the family or the incidence of alcoholism and suicide-there can be 
no doubt about the illness of our society, about the glaring incom- 
ptibility of its institutions with the health, happiness, and develop 
ment of man. To be quite clear about it: the question relates not to 
the subjective reaction to the prevailing condition on the part of 
those whom it affects. Even if all 100 percent of society, not only 
Krich's 85 percent, were cantent to "hang on'' to the existing state 
of affairs, the finding of the objective inadequacy of the existing 
social order would remain valid. What is more, such a state 
of mass intoxication and "tranquilization" .would in itself represent 
the most conspicuous and indeed most dangerous aspect of the entire 
pathological syndrome. It can r b e ,  and usually is, objected that under 
such circumstances there would #be no criteria left for judging an 
existing state of society. Freud was fully aware of this difficulty even 
if d y  implicitly indicating a solution: "In the neurosis of an 
individual we can use as a starting point the contrast presented to 
us between the patient and his m\;ironment which we assume to be 
'normal.' No such background as this would be available for any 
society similarly affected; it would have to be supplied in some other 
way." (Sigmund Freud, Cwilizatwn and Its Discontents, London, 
1955, p. 142. Italics added.) This "other way" is social 
though t-the age-old philosophical, scientific, artistic, and practical 
effort to develop standards for man's "right way of life," to clarify 
the concept' of what constitutes a "good society." What Dr. Krich 
haughtily d i s m b e s  because of "operational inutility" is actually 
not just my modest bit of theorizing but all of the truth-searching 
tradition of mankind, whether it has found expression in the Bible 
or in the Koran, in the meditations of the Greek philosophers or in 
the creations of the Renaissance artists, in the writings of' Shalris- 
pare and Tolstoy, or in the far-flung studies of Marx and Freud. 
All of these endeavors were "operationally useless"-+xcept that it 
is thanks to just this unremitting, all-embracing quest for the cM. 
ication and creation of the prerequisites of the "good life" that 
we are able today to specify with much more precision than in earlier 
times what the conditions are that need to be fulfilled for the 
somatic and psychic welfare and growth of man. The denial of the 
possibility. to identify, let alone establish, such conditions reflects 
either the ideological blinkers of empiricist agnosticism that (by no 
m e  fortuitously) obscure intellectual vision in our society, or, 
(worse still), the vested interests of those whose primary concern 
is to discredit theoretically and obstruct practically all radical depart- 
ure from the status quo. 
It is with reference to these indispensable conditions for human 
welfare that we have to examine the problem explicitly or implicitly 
raised by all my critics: whether there has been and is a c&tinual 
improvement of human life within the framework of the capitalist 
order. The answer is far from simple. There has been in this country 
as well as in other advanced capitalist countries a tremendous devel- 
opment of productive resources* It has resulted in a considerable rise 
of the standard of living and in an equally pronounced reduction 
of the burden of human toil. The process of rationalization and 
enlightenment to which this growth of productivity is intimately 
related has also led to a certain liberalization of mores and to a 
certain relaxation of tabus, weakening the reign of superstition and 
obscurantism. Yet i t  would be inadmissibly rash to jump from these 
undeniable facts to the conclusim that these processes have im- 
pr6ved the psychic welfare of people. Comparisons over time are 
notoriously difficult, particularly if what is to be compared are psychic 
stites of different people at different times, but a strong case can 
be made for the proposition that the material advances attained 
under capitalism have been bought at a very high price in terms of 
repression and alienation. In the words of me expert, speaking for 
many, "There is no indication that the mental health of tbe nation 
has improved. Delinquency is s t d y  rising; juvenile drug addicts 
probably run into tens of thousands (a phenomenon unknown in any 
other part of the Western world) ; we constantly hear of infantile 
schizophrenics, and the number of neurotics is certainly not less than 
it was under the sternest Victorian upbringing." (Dr. Melitta 
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Schmideberg, director of clinical service, Association for the Psychi- 
atric Treatment of Offenders, in Phi Delta Kappan, December, 
1959.) The rise of juvenile delinquency-probably one of the most 
eloquent indices of the deterioration of the psychic state of young 
people and of the conditions obtaining in their families--cannot be 
disputed : 
The records of juvenile courts, compiled by the Children's 
Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
show that the number of children brought before the courts 
increased from 300,000 in 1948 to 435,000 in 1953. Only 10 per- 
cent of this increase could be explained by the growth of the 
juvenile population. The court figures show the trend, but they 
do not show the full extent of juvenile delinquency. The Senate 
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency estimates that there are at 
least three juvenile offenders brought to the attention of the 
police for every child actually brought to court. So, at the 
current rate, the number of youngsters who get into trouble with 
the police each year is about one million and a quarter. If the 
rate continues to rise, as it has since 1948, the number will reach 
1,700,000 in 1960. (Irving Adler, What We Want Of Our 
Schools, New York, 1957, pp. 109-110.) 
Is there any justification for the view, apparently held by Dn. 
Neubauer and Krich, that it is an important "offset" to this pro- 
found illness of society that in our time there has been an increase 
in sexual activity, that now "we find not only inhibition but also 
the opposite--selfish indulgence with insufficient controls"? (Neu- 
bauer) I t  is surely a remarkable kind of "depth psychology" which 
judges the intensity of repression endured and the extent of genuine 
gratification experienced by people on the basis of the "turnover 
in the sex market" as measured by the number of sexual trans- 
actions registered by Kinsey and kindred researchers. One might 
have hoped that, if nothing else, this fallacy of psychological reason- 
ing would be put to rest by the work of Freud. Indeed, it would 
seem to me that the very opposite of what is maintained by Drs. 
Neubauer and Krich comes nearer the truth. As the objective pos- 
sibilities for human liberatian from want and toil and exploitation 
expand, as the gap between the freedom that could be realized on 
the basis of the attained development of productive resources and 
the misery enforced by the capitalist order widens, the repressive 
function of capitalist institutions and culture becomes more rather 
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than less pronounced, the mechanisms enforcing "adjustment," con- 
formity, and passive "hanging on" become more elaborate and more 
pervasive. And the more the realktian of society's objective poten- 
tialities comes to depend on people's capacity to seize the historic 
opportunity, the stronger becomes the dependence of the system 
on obscuring and confusing the issues, on the denial of the very 
existence of those potentialities, and on the cultivation of a sense 
of contentment with such pseudo-happiness, pseuddove, and 
pseudo-productivity as may be attainable within the capitalist order. 
The resulting state of deception, delusion, and paralysis thus turns, in 
the current phase of capitalist development, into the principal 
obstacle to human advancement. 
This brings me to the second question raised by my critics, 
namely, the causes of the existing situation. Here Dr. Reider is 
flogging a dead or a wrong horse when inveighing against the 
"sheer irresponsibility" or "mythological monstrosity" of a view that 
"economic changes in themselves will resolve human problems," or 
that "methods of production have a direct effect upon the human 
psyche." The key words in those sentences are clearly the ones that 
I have underscored: "in themselves" and "direct." But who ever 
claimed that economic changes in themselves have a direct effect 
upon the human psyche? Certainly not Marx who repeatedly re- 
turned to the intricate relation between the socio-economic base and 
the so-called "superstructure," and whose concept of alienation en- 
compasses the very heart of the psychoIogical problem. Nor can 
it be fairly said about the lecture to which my critics have addressed 
themselves that it postulates a "direct" relation between the 
economic and the psychic spheres. There I was concerned precisely 
with the mediations between those two realms, with what might be 
called the "transmission belts" which connect the relations of pro- 
duction prevailing in a given epoch to the psychic structure of the 
individuals living in that epoch. In fact, the lecture represents 
nothing if not an attempt to draw attention to some of these 
"transmission belts" which are usually ignored or sidestepped in 
psychological thought. And since the role played by i n t r a f d y  
relations is surely not one of modem psychology's neglected step- 
children, I did not feel an urgent need to emphasize a factor the 
importance of which is generally recognized even if not always put 
in the proper theoretical context. 
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If it is an impmnidble wershplification and wlgarkation 
of Marxian thought to disregard the "txan&on belts,'? and to 
consider the ~gychic processes as a simple, direct reflection of m c b  
ecbnamic relations, it is even more erroneous and more dangerous to 
treat these ' ' - d o n  belts" not for what they am but as ultimate, 
imdueible sources of human conduct. This position is the essenee 
of what I called psychologism arid leads inevitably to postulatingq an 
abtonomous psyche producing and reproducing itself in the lofty realm 
of the spirit fax removed from the concrete, material bases of hum- 
existence; And the ccmythological monstrosity" of such a concept 
of the human eoul is not banished in the least by a "generous" 
acknowledgement that there may be after all some "interdepend- 
ence'' between the psychic sphere and that of the forces and rela- 
tions of production. For the mere recognition of the existence of 
interdependence means very little both theoretically and practically 
unless it is accompanied by the idenflication of the active, leading 
component in the interrelation. There is not much to be gained from 
what may look at first like the profound wisdom of the pmpositiari 
that everything depends on everything else. The crux of the matter 
is to discover what accounts primarily for the dynamics of the entire 
structure, what constitutes the Archimedian point from which * it 
r y y  be possible to move, to change the wble system. The neglect 
of this consideration leads both to theoretical sterility and to prac- 
tical impotence. Thus Erich Fromm's insistence "that progress can only 
occur when changes are made simultaneously in. the economic, socio- 
political 'and culbval spheres; that any progress restricted to oire 
sphere is destructive to progress -in all spheres" (The Sane Society, 
pp. viii-lr, italics in the original), while appearing to be most radical, 
would justify the . renunciation from ,all meaningful action. Since 
social energies are limited, since different changes require different 
time spans, since finally some changes are more important than 
others-if for no other reason than because once undertaken .they 
cause or f d t a t e  other, derivative changes-the categoric iGF- 
tik that either all changes should take place at the same time or 
nok  be undertaken at all amounts practically to a counsel of pas- 
sivity, to support for the status quo. 
It should be needless to say that the recognition of the neces- 
sity to assign different weights to different elements in a relation, 
that the emphasis on the inequality of the strength and influence of 
different forces making up the historr'd process is not the same- 
as the assignment of an e x c l u h ,  "dire~t,~'causative function to any 
one W c u l a r  factor (or combination of factors). What it does mean 
is that changes in certain areas are more important, more -urn- 
tial than changes in other areas, that action exercised in one segment 
of the whole has a greater impact on the whole than action e m m k d  
in other segments. Accordingly the Marxist view that the relations 
of production and the socio-economic structure resting upon them 
play a crucially important part in shaping dl aspects of human exist- 
ence not only does not exclude but indeed demands the concrete 
specification of intemnediate links, of all the complex intmIatkns 
which weld the disparate facets of the social process into an organic 
whole. 
But, to repeat, the recognition of the existence of this cmpIex 
interrelation should not be permitted to k c m e  the night m which 
all cats are gray. It is not the psychic makeup of the walker that has 
caused the emergence of the giant corporation or of the automated 
factory. It is the objective economic process that brought into being 
these institutions of monopoly capitalism, and these institutions of 
monopoly capitalism have exercised a profound impact on tht psychic 
structures of the individuals caught in their nets. And this daa not 
imply that employment in an autcmated factory "by itself" changes 
"directly" the psyche of the worker, nor does it mean that in some 
way even the changes that do take place in the psyche of the worker 
have no "feedbacky' effect on the working principles of the corpora- 
tion or the factory. What it does call for-and imperatively~-is 
dealing with first things first, distinguishing betwan roats and 
branches, the attribution of the movement of the carriage to the 
horse rather than to the cart. 
In the light of these consideratims one can only rub me's epes 
in astonishment at Dr. Neubauer's aqument: 'When we qIore 
the causes of, let us say, a phob'la, our patients do not inform w 
that their central conflict stems f m  their relationship to social insti- 
tutions or from their role in connection with the means af produc- 
tion." This is indeed "clinical empiricismyy gone wild! What w d d  
be the need for any analysis if all we had to do to estabbh the 
causes of any human and social phenomenon were to ~+$~tes whsrt- 
ever. information may be supplied by the individuals affected? I 
wonder how many somatic patients inform their phY;cians that the 
Koch bacillus is the cause of the tuberculosis of their lungs, or haw 
many mental patiemts inform their therapists that their infmtile 
fantasies or the methods of child rearing to 
have something to do with their character 
matter, how many businessmen report that 
due to certain developments in the realm 
investment? As Marx once remarked, "all 
fluous if the appearance of things cainc 
essence." 
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which they were exposed 
formation? And for that 
their profits or losses are 
of aggregate saving and 
science would be super- 
ided directly with their 
When it comes to the third issue raised in the preceding articles 
-the therapeutic value of psychoanalysis-the discussion becomes 
difficult indeed. Having no professional qualifications in this area, 
I must canfine myself to a few theoretical observations. As stated in 
the concluding paragraph of my lecture, I do not deny the "pos- 
sibility of 'individuals who are ill finding a measure of relief through 
currently available means of psychiatric treatment." In other words, 
I am perfectly willing to grant that psychiatry (of whatever doctrinal 
orientation) may be capable of enhancing the patient's ability to 
cope with the surrounding reality and/or to carry his travails with 
a lessened sense of unhappiness. Yet, as Freud recognized, "neurosis 
and psychosis are both of them an expression of the rebellion of the 
id against the outer world, of its 'pain)) unwillingness to adapt itself 
to necessity . . . or, if one prefers, of its incapacity to do so." ("The 
Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis," Collected Papers, Vol. 
11, p. 279.) This raises a problem of the utmost importance. The 
"outer world" against which the "idy' rebels is both a physical and a 
social world; on the one hand, the hardships, privations, and -toil 
imposed by scarcity and the effort required by man's struggle with 
nature; on the other hand, the repression, compulsion, and suffering 
which a social order based upon the exploitation of man by man 
inflicts upon the individual. To be sure, both of these "outer worldsyy 
are aspects of the same reality; it is indispensable, however, to see 
them in their unity and dialectical interaction as well as in their 
specificity and differentiation. For to the extent to which the 
individual rebels against the constraints of the physical world and 
the oppressiveness of the social order founded upon and resulting 
from it, his rebellion i s  a rebellion against what Freud refers to as 
66 necessity." Insofar, however, as the oppressiveness of the social order 
is no longer a reflection and inevitable outgrowth of physical scarcity 
but a means for the perpetuation of the existing relations of produc- 
tion in the interests of a privileged, exploitative minority, to this 
extent the individual's rebellion ceases to be a rebellion against 
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"necessity." If he is caught-as he usually +in the comprehensive 
network of bourgeois ideology, the main tenet of which is the treat- 
ment of so~kl relations as if they were physical, natural relations, his 
rebellian becomes misguided, shifts from the actual source of his 
suffering to an imaginary source and develops into a destructive and 
self-destructive drive. Only if he is capable of piercing the fog of 
bourgeois mentality and of recognizing that it is the social order in 
which he lives that blocks the attainment of genuine plenty and the 
growth, development, and freedom of man, can the individual turn 
his rebellion against the real obstacles to his happiness and thus direct 
his protest against a meaningful target. To avoid a possible misunder- 
standing: I do not mean to suggest that the social order and its 
injunctions do not confront the individual as a necessity. The neces- 
sity involved is, however, a dialectical necessity: ineluctable and in- 
exorable at one stage of historic development, it is brittle and over- 
throwable at another-given sufficient determination, courage, and 
insight on the part of people. 
If psychoanalysis would undertake to advance the individud's 
understanding of the precise nature of the "outer worldy' which im- 
poses upon him his privations and his suffering and thus reorient his 
protest from fetishes to the actual causes of his distress, it would 
perform a progressive task. Yet such has not by any means been the 
function of psychoamlysis, as pointed out by Dr. Lehrman. Freud 
himself, as well as most of his followers, subsumed both aspects of 
the "outer worlds'-the physical and the social-under the concept 
of "necessity," with this necessity seen as stemming from essentially 
unalterable biologically determined libidinous drives. Even some 
sociologically-minded writers such as C. Wright Mills and Herbert 
Marcuse, tend unwittingly to obscure the matter by attributing the 
ccnecessity" of the "outer world" in the present historical epoch 
to "civilization" or to "modern industrid societyy' rather th& to 
the specific, concrete socio-economic relations of monopoly capital- 
ism. Quite naturally, if the "outer world" is considered to be an 
immovable wall, or, as in socio-psychologism, a somewhat elastic 
but essentially unchangeable enclosure-the only way of dealing 
with the problem of the individual is to reduce as much as possible 
his unwillingness or incapacity to adapt himself to this situation, to 
curtail and destroy his individuality. What Dr. Reider derisively 
refers to as an "old saw9'-that "treatment of emotional disturbances 
invariably tends to take the fight out of an individual and make him 
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adjust to his enVir0nrnent"-is not a fortuitous outcome of , 
therapy cawed by the way it is "often practiced" (Dr. Lehrman) ; 
it is related to the very nature of the cure that it sets out to proride. 
And this is not contradicted by such successes as it may be able to 
attain. For these successes consist at best in "transfers" of individuals 
from Dr. Krich's 15 percent group to Dr. Krich's 85 percent group. 
It is very far from my wish to minimize the vital importance of such 
a "transfer" to the suffering individual. No price in resignation, in 
"life adjustment," in tranquilizatim may be too high for him to 
pay for some ability to get along, to "hang on," to experience some 
modicum of gratification. It s h d d  be clear, however, that this 
outcome is a cure only in the limited sense of "killing the pain." 
A genuine solution of the human predicament in the present 
stage of our development is not achievable except through a far- 
reaching txmsforrnation in the basic existential conditions of society. 
The process of production which under capitalism dominates man 
must be brought under his conscious control and turned from a 
governor into a tool of his life. This is an indispensable pre- + 
requisite for true human freedom and therefore also the fundammtd , 
requiremest for the growth and devdopment of the indiuidd. Dr. 
Neubauer is grievously mistaken in saying that "when man shall 
have mastered society . . . we will still have need for a science of the I 
individual and his inner me." (Italics added.) It is exactly the other - 
way round! Only when the socio-economic apparatus of repdon ,  
domination, and exploitation i s  destroyed and replaced by an "as- 
sociation in which the free development of each is the condition 
for the free development of all" (Marx and Engels)--anly then will 
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there be a real "science of the individual and his inner life,'# for 
only then will there be a possibility for the existence and flowering 
of the individual himself. Only when the "furies of private pmpt?rty9' 
are tamed and eventually banished, only when the repressive, destruc- 
tive, and dehumanizing relations and ideology of capitalism are 
rendered fossils of a dark past-nly then will people be able to face 
directly and to deal rationally with the challenges, the perplexities, 
add the immense potentialities encompassed by the human sod, 
APPENDIX 
THE SOVIET VIEW' OF, PSYCHOANALYSIS 
BY D. F E D O T O V ,  M. D. 
In the Soviet Union we greatly honor everything of genuine 
worth in our own national as w d  as in world science. We cherish 
the germs of human reasan that have come down to us from past 
millennia, such a9 the writings of Hippocrates and the Canon of 
medical science by Abou-Ali-IbnSina (Avicenna) ; we revere the 
heroic labors of Edward Jenner and the immortal work of Elie Mecb 
nikov; we admire the scientific realism of Claude Bernard and the 
immense intellectual sweep of Ivan Sechenov. Contrary to the d u m -  
nies of our ill-wishers, in no other land ie there such profound respect 
for Charles Danvin and Paul Ehrlich, for Luther Burbank and 
Louis Pastew: as in ours. We appreciate the scientific comtribution 
of Edward Fleming and the strict objectivity of the outstanding 
researches of Walter Cannm. And when we speak of the great Ivan 
Pavlov, the creator of the materialist conception of the higher nervous 
activity, we at the same time bear in mind that this conception could 
not have been formulated without the previous labom of Sechenov 
as well as the great legacy *f DDaMrin's creative genius, 
We value highly the works of the advanced scholars of today. 
But while paying due respect to everything which is truly scientific 
and serves man's progress, we cannot indifferently let pass theories 
that are anti-scientific and that drag human reason bac-d. One 
such theory, widely held in several countries, is that of psychdysis, 
the creation of the A u s h .  neurmpathologist Sigmund Freud. 
I have received a kind invitation from the editors of this journal 
to express myself on the subject indicated in the title. I am glad to 
do so.. 
First, it should be pointed out that .while in the 19208, and earlierY 
a nmber of physicians in the Soviet Union did evince some interest 
in psychoanalysis, at the present time Swiet physicians, paychologkts, 
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and physiologists read psychoanalytic works d y  for the purpose 
of keeping in touch with the scientific interests of our cqlleagues 
abroad. 
To meet this purpose of the Soviet scholars, our libraries sub- 
scribe to books and journals on psychoanalysis, dang with other pub- 
lications issued abroad. Also, a number of psychoandytic works, pm- 
ticularly the major works of Freud, are available in Russian transla- 
tion and are thus accessible to our readers. 
But neither the theoretical works of the psychoanalysts nor their 
practical activities satisfy Soviet scholars and physicians. Indeed, 
both are rejected as lacking in scientific substance. 
The reasons why this attitude toward psychoanalysis has become 
established in the Soviet Union cannot be grasped without taking 
into account the tremendous significance that Pavlov's teachings 
and the materialistic view in general have assumed in Soviet science. 
Freud and his followers have been unable to find a method 
for the objective exploration of the physiology of the brain. At the 
same time, Pavlov's teaching has provided science with a tremen- 
dously significant method for such exploration. At the present time, 
both here and abroad, including the United States, a great deal is 
being done toward the mastery and development of Pavlov's teach- 
ings, and methods are being worked out for the objective explora- 
tion of the brain's functioning. The methods of conditioned reflexes 
and electroencephalography, particularly, are assuming evw greater 
importance. In this way, the progress of true science is providing 
studcats with a means for the objective investigation of psychic 
processes. 
Yet the psychoanalysts persist in ignoring the achievements of 
science and continue to treat psychic processes as something utterly 
independent of the physiological processes in the brain, the bask of 
psychic activity. In his Lectures on Psychoanaly.k, Freud wrote that 
in its investigations psychoanalysis must cast aside all anatomical, 
chemical, and physiological theories as irrelevant and must operate 
d y  with psychological concepts that are specifically psychoanalytic. 
This position of Freud's continues to characterize, in essence, psy- 
choanalytic work to the present time. I 
) Our materialistic view renders such a dichotomy between the 
psyche and its material base quite unacceptable. In this ignoring by 
psychoanalysis of the scientific discoveries in the physiology of the 
brain we discern a reactionary tendency to drag science backward. 
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This position of psychoanalysis, the position of separa.td@be 
psyche from the brain, has, quite naturally, a negative effect in 
practice. We will permit ourselves only one example. 
The psychoanalysts have often turned their attention to ulcerous 
affections. A number of American authors, starting from psycho- 
analytic positions, have attempted to solve the problem by consider- 
ing exclusively psychic factors. Thus, one of the leaders of Ameri- 
can psychoanalysis, F. Alexander, asserted in an article which ap- 
peared a few years ago that at the basis of the etiology of ulcerous ail- 
ments lies a particularly intense and, by its very nature ungratified, 
"oral-aggressive" urge to satiation, an urge that has been driven into 
the unconscious. Hence the pathogenesis of ulcers is reduced to a 
fantastic psychological mechanism. Let us see how the same ailment 
is viewed by the proponents of Pavlovian views. 
Academician K. M. Bykov (Leningrad) and his collaborator 
I. T. Kurstin, after thorough research, established that the etiology 
of ulcers is compounded of many factors: type of higher nervous 
activity, presence of characteristic "ulcerous diathesis," regimen of 
eating, living conditions, disturbance in the functioning of the vegeta- 
tive nervous system, and various changes in the biochemistry of the 
organism. Such a broad understanding of the etiology of ulcers 
naturdly determines the system of treatment. We are convinced that 
the one-sided view of the psychoanalysts in this matter reflects 
negatively on their handling of patients, and prevents the timely 
application of necessary and truly useful methods of treatment. 
Similar differences in the understanding and treatment of sick- 
nesses may be cited without end. 
We are definitely at variance with the psychoanalytic trends in 
the understanding of the nature of the psyche. We start from the 
premise that the psyche is a reflection in the brain of objectively 
existent reality. Human consciousness reflects human existence and 
this insures the oneness of man and his environment. This is not 
the view held by Freud or by any of the later psychodytic schools. 
In psychoanalytic theory, the role of the external world in forming 
the psyche is extremely limited. The psychoanalytic schools clhg to 
the notion that the unconscious is a separate subdivision of the pychi, 
essentially independent of the external world, the environment, and 
one that exerts a decisive influence on man's consciousness.  an 
is thus fenced off from the world, from the reality of which he is 
a part and outside bf which, indeed Gthout- his oneness with which, 
be is inconceivable. Thus psychoanalysis ignores the role of the 
w e d  envircmment in man's pysche, it d d e s  man's. d essence. 
This psy&aaxmlytic conception, too, affects quite negatively psycho-, 
d y t i c  -practice. Here, too, we shall give one example. 
In the USSR we are dl against war, against aggrmiw and 
a g g r m .  We strive to foster in our children a love for peace and. 
a feeling of frimdship for all people, and races of all lands. Psycho- 
analysis bases itself on the false proposition that man is by nature 
a#gpidve. Freud, in a letter to the fsunous Einstein, wrote that war 
was "a perfectly natural thing; unquestionably, it has a sound pq+ 
blogicd baris and, in fact, it can scarcely be avoided." (Letters, 
Vole V.) P$ychiatrists in America holding to psychoanalytic positions 
(at least some of them) advise the providing of children with 
"atomic toys))' with comics d o w i n g  in atrocious crimes. This on 
the asamption that they would provide an outlet for children's 
aggressive tendencies. Such views cannot but further the spread of 
the "war psychosis))' contribute to juvenile delinquency, and injure 
the health of the young. 
Psychdyt ic  theory denies the historical development of man 
and his psyche* The determining force in shaping man's conduct .iq, 
the psychoadpts believe, instinct, particularly sex. 
But the whole of n a t d  science, the entire development af 
scimce, indicates that the psyche is the product of historical develop- 
ment, the result of man's being primarily a creature of social forces. 
The unbiased study of facts indicates rathex convincingly that it is 
not the sexual instinct that p d d e s  virtually all the stimuli for 
human behavior, but, to the can*, that the human personality 
as a whole, shaped by h*ry in a social setting, determines the 
forms of instinctual manifestations. 
Freud and his followers do not hesitate to propound a psycho-. 
analytic theory of society and morals. They explain such phenomena 
as national oppreesian, the behavior of criminids, the social activities 
of .people as d e s t a t i m s  of the same blind elemental forces, 
innate instincts, and drives* 
Characteristic in this connection, for example, is the . way in 
which Freud attempts to explain the inferior status of women which, 
as we know, exists in capitalist countries. Now this "inferk,ritfS 
is wholly conditioned by the social structure of those countries.. But 
unwilling to see this, Freud argued that because of the anatmic 
diffezencess between the saes the wamen themse1ves see themeluies 
A P P E N D'IX 
as having been subjected to castration and think it wrong to regard 
"both sexes as equal in social position and worth." (Letters, Vol. V, 
pp. 196-197.) . 
It certainly is unthinkable that a scientifically unacceptable 
theory can offer an acceptable methodology wen in one areaI the 
area of treating nervous and psychic disorders. 
Because of their disregard of the patho-physiologicd bases of 
neuro-psychic disorders, the circle of which is excessively and im- 
permissibly enhged by the proponents of psychoanalysis, the psycho- 
analysts underestimate the importance of modem methods of 
medicinal treatment. 
Psychoanallytic therapy f i i  its attention on the sexual aspect 
in the life of the patients. This unavoidably leaves a heavy imprint 
on the patients, gives them a wrong orientation, and results in mord 
t r a m  
The psychoanalytic method of treatment, furthermore, fixes the 
patient's attention on the distant past, on early childhood, even on 
the prenatal period. This too pulls the patients away from the 
present, from the real conflicts in their immediate existence, and from 
their real and immediate perspectives. Surely it can scarcely be 
thought that the neuroses developed by an unemployed worker who 
has been deprived of a livelihood for himself and his family, by a 
mother who has lost a child, and by a do-nothing whose neurosis 
arose out of idleness and boredom, out of satiation and lack of any 
interests, all spring essentially from the same causes that had had 
their origin in the remote past. We hold that, while due consideration' 
must be given to early, real, proved, and not imagined psychological 
traumata, the doctor's main attention in the treatment of neurotics 
must be centered on their present life, on the perspectives of the 
immediate future; that in the pf~cess of psychotherapy the physician 
must keep closer to what presently disturbs the patient. 
Psychoanalysts cite positive results allegedly obtained '&rough 
psychoanalytic treatment. The apparent cures of which they boast 
are, however, in fact but temporary improvements. Such impmve--. 
ments have also been obtained by witch doctors -with patients who 
had blind faith in them. These seeming cures have been known since 
ancient times,. the results of most varied- "healing" methods. The* 
are all based on the power of suggestion, ;he physiological nature of 
which has been established by Pavlw and his followers. In this con- 
nection, we can refer to the many observations appearing in the 
literature abroad indicating how unstable are the results obtained 
by the methods of psychoanalytic treatment. 
The source of neuroses is traceable to the social relations among 
people. Neuroses, as Pavlov thought, are affections conditioned by 
the imposition of excessive demands on the nervous system, in par- 
ticular, the mental and physical strain resulting from painful ex- 
periences (psychic traumas). 
This makes possible the development of sound methods for the 
prevention of neurotic and other psychic disorders. A knowledge 
of the physiological mechanisms of neuroses makes possible rational 
medical and psychotherapeutic action. 
I t  is quite different with psychoanalytic theory which reduces 
the problem of therapy to the digging up and baring of "complexes" 
of "suppressed desiresyy in the realm of the unconscious. , 
As we see it, Freudism finds itself-in crying contradiction to the 
optimistic tendencies of modem progressive science. Instead of exact 
knowledge based on experiment and verified in life, it proffers arbi- 
trarily concocted hypothetical schemes. Instead of paying proper 
regard to the potency of human reasan, Freudism asserts that man 
and his knowledge are under the sway of elemental inborn forces. 
Instead of viewing man as the product of socio-historical develop- 
ment, an integral part of his social milieu, Freudism, in substance, 
affirms the unrelatedness of man's conduct to the multiplicity of 
external canditions. 
Is it not clear that human progress cannot be achieved by irra- 
tional and telwlogical investigations? 
Only true science, based on principles of materialistic cognition, 
will secure the further development of human knowledge and help 
achieve significant successes in revealing ever more of nature's secrets. 
We see Freudism as a form of reaction to the magnificent suc- 
cesses of materialistic scientific knowledge in the fields of physiology 
and medicine. In this it is not alone. Among the reactionary forces 
arrayed against genuine science belongs everything that bases itself 
not on principles of exact scientific method, but on speculative con- 
structions masked as science. 
In a fit of candor, Freud himself admitted in a letter to Ein- 
stein that his activity was an adventure in science. This, it seems to 
me, is the most sipifickt of all of Freud's utterances. Freudism 
was and is an admitted instance of adventure in science. This is the 
reason why in our country it enjoys neither popularity nor r&sFt. 
A PSYCHOANALYST REPLIES 
BY NORMAN REIDER, M . D .  
It was kind of the editors to ask me to write a reply to Dr. 
Fedotov's comments about psychoanalysis. It  is with mixed feelings 
that I have agreed to do so, because it is a sort of useless gesture 
to reply in any polemic way to old arguments which are largely 
derivative of an official governmental stand of long duration in the 
Soviet Union, which are not the result of an investigatory open- 
minded attitude towards the nature of psychoanalysis, and which 
arguments have been answered over and over again in the scientific 
literature. Nevertheless, - the hopelessness of convincing Dr. Fedotov 
to his satisfaction is somewhat mitigated by the anticipatian of a 
receptiveness on the part of readers to the possibility that Dr. Fed* 
tov's arguments are not the last word in the matter. 
I cannot resist the temptation to pick point by point most of 
the. arguments of minor nature throughout Dr. Fedotov's discourse 
and to attempt to answer them briefly, after which I proceed to what 
I consider the more valid scientific grounds for the difference of 
opinion. 
By way of initial summary, it can be said that Dr. Fedotov 
simply does not understand psychoanalysis or he would not write 
the way he does. For example, he states that Freud and his followers 
have been unable to find a method for the objective exploration of 
the physiology of the brain. It seems that to Dr. Fedotov psychology 
can only be neurophysiological psychology. Freud made it clear that 
he left the problems of the biology of man to the biologist, and of 
the physiology to the physiologist. It  is also amply clear to Freud and 
his followers that there is no dichotomy between psyche and soma 
as Dr. Fedotov would have one believe. Freud was primarily con- 
cerned with the psychic representation of biological phenomena and 
not their physiology or chemistry, a fact that has never beem grasped 
by many of his critics. Freud did not consMer anatomical, chemical, 
and physiological theories as irrelevant. He considered them quite 
important in their own field and he even went so far as to express 
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the expectation that some day chemical means would be the method 
of treating all psychiatric conditions. 
An example that Dr. P&tov gives as tbe hodm .result 
of the deged sepa&ting off of psyche from soma in psychoanalytic 
considerations is a brief quotation frqm Dr. F r a ~  Alexander about 
the etiology of ulcers. This criticism of one aspect of r e k c h  in 
the psychic aspects of the etiology of ulcers, having mainly to do 
with libidinal derivatives, is incorrectly represented as being the psy- 
choanalyst's consideration of the total etiology. Psychoanalysts from 
Freud on have acknowledged that the cor&itutiod diatheais and 
numerous external factors play very si&icant roles in all psycho- 
somatic conditiolis such as ulcers, and they make no bones about it. 
That they happen to be interested to a great measure in the distri- 
bution and fate of certain kinds, of libidinal energy in psych0s0matic 
*conditions is as much justified as when a biochemist is concaned 
in highly specialized studies in the cellular metaboIh of the tubercle 
bacillus. One might criticize such work in the problem of tubescu- 
lo& in regard to many aspects, but one has no right to say - that 
such work is valueless because it does not point out sufficiently the 
social factors in the etiology of tubercuIosis. This is in effect what 
Dr. Fedotov does. 
Nowhere does Dr. Fedotav show his Iack of knowledge of Freud's 
concepts more than in his statement that the import of the external 
world in psychoa,nalytic theory is &tremely limited; the psycho- 
analytic concept of the unconscious as having an influence on mads 
conscious life by no means d e s  the implication that man is thus 
fenced off frmi the world, ''from the reality of which he is a part.)' 
This is a naive conclusion that is not an inhekent part of psycho- 
analytic theory In the slightest. Nor are Freud's early psskktic 
views on the in&tability of War necesdy derivative frorn his 
theories. Apparently h: Fedotw is not acquainted with Freud's 
later opinions on war ivhich were considerably more optimistic. But, 
alas,' it seems that Freud's earlier sociol0g;cal specu1ations have had 
more dcati~n than his later ones. 
Surely to attribute to Freud. or to his fol1owers any view that 
they "advise the providing of children with 'atomic toys,' with 
comics wallowing in atrocious crimes," sounds as if Dr. Fedotov has 
fallen prey to a mite of propaganda. I know of no psychiatrists, 
whether of psychoanalytic persuasion or not, who "advise" such 
practices; I think that at worrit a- psychiatrist might on one occasion 
or another resignedly condone them, making his dative inefftctive- 
ness in   hanging -the world. 
.'Equdy striking in Dr. Fedotds evidence of misundentanding 
of pdych6anslysis is the statement that Kpsychoanalytic theory denies 
the 'historical. development of man and his psyche." It is the essential 
core of psychoanalytic theory that it is a genetic psychology, a psy- 
chology that p 1 . a ~  central importance upon the historical develop- 
meht of the psyche. MOT-, it is more explicit in its attempts to 
show how instinchi farces, which are biologically determined, are 
constantly undegoing changes under the influence of a t ana l  fac- 
ton, a '  dislectical concept which has more universal applicability 
than anything that has derived out of Pavlovian neurophysidogy or 
any other system of5pq&oIogy, at least to date. It is also true that 
psychoanalytic theory has atelred into considerations of sociology, 
crMnoIogy, art, literature and other fields of human endeavor, 
again via a universality due to the nature of the theory, a claim 
w h i c h - m o t  be made by B e c h t d n  ar Pavlov's ~exology.  
There is a curious contmdictioln in Dr. Fedotov's arguments. 
He attacks psychodysis as being ahisboric m d  then he attacks its 
treatment method as laying ernphis upon individual hbtoxy. The 
sw sort of curious contradiction exists in his remark that the source 
of newixes is traceable to the sodal relations among people, a 
hypothesis which, afta agreement as to defiition of terms, would 
be quite acceptable to & d y s t s  as a partid explanation of the 
phenomenon of n&. But Dr. Fedotov continua that, "Neuroses, 
as Pavlov thought, i r e  affectim conditioned by the imposition of 
excessive demands on the nervous system.'s Now just what this has to 
do with mial relations among people is not clear, nor is it then 
clear why such great emphasis is placed upon the medical treatment 
of .neuroses which are caused by social relations. Should they not, 
therefore, be treated by social means exclusively? Yes and no, I 
SUP- - 
- TBk ~ r t  of palemic discusdon could be continued, but I shall 
leave th~*pleaant r ies  to get to the basic h e .  For sorm maron 
or otha 'themi has been a fail- of Soviet psychologists to rec-e 
the essence af Freudian psychology. Their main attack stems 
largely from the fact that they appreciate stme of Freud's concepts as 
king "ide~~htic" rather than m a t e t i c .  ThQ is quite strange, 
e s m 1 ~  since ' ~ d y  vehement attacks upon psychoanalysis have 
been made by c 6 ~ t i ~ e s , "  who w e e  with the official definition 
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of Freudianism in the 1955 Soviet edition of the Short Philosophic 
Dictionary as a science "developing the basest and most repellant 
instinctual tendencies"-only they call it materialistic and not ideal- 
istic! The point is that the theologian's arguments that Freudianism 
has biologic roots are much closer to the roots than the Soviet view. 
Yet both fear it (or at least do not like it) and it is interesting to 
examine why. My own hunch is that all totalitarian systems have 
to oppose psychoanalytic theory since one of its sociological implica- 
tions is that of putting the welfare of the individual above the wel- 
fare of the state. This by no means settles the question, I fully realize. 
What is likewise important is that there exists a considerable 
literature, reference to which can most easily be found in Jones's 
third volume of his biography of Freud, just recently published, of 
extensive discources an psychoanalysis as dialectical materialism in psy- 
chology; this point of view has become quite unfashionable in recent 
years, perhaps regrettably s-and, then again, perhaps not-but at 
any rate these arguments are quite cogent and most interesting. Per- 
haps the Soviet psychologists have no access to the psychoanalytic 
literature of the 20s and 309, and that is why such references are 
absent in the critique. Who knows? . . 
To return: Freud discovered a method, analogous to those 
methqds by which man's urine, sputum, feces, heart sounds, brain 
waves, and gastric contents can be subjected to analysis and investi- 
gation; Freud found a way by which man's dreams, thoughts, wishes, 
actions, imaginations, aspirations, reveries, and impulses can be 
studied. He modeled his own theoretical considerations on those of 
the physical sciences and achieved a consistent theory of the struc- 
ture of the psychic apparatus, one of the greatest achievements of 
the intellect, even though he himself humbly called it an "adventure 
in science," a subtlety which escapes Dr. Fedotov. Psychoanalysis, 
a result of his efforts, is not only a theory but it has now become a 
body of knowledge and carries along with it a practice based upon 
the theory. The everchanging and inquiring attitude of the relation- 
ship of the theory to the practice, not nearly as doctrinaire. as many 
of its opponents would like to believe, is a remarkable advance in 
scientific psychology, one which many socalled dialectical material- 
ists would envy if they dared to understand it and give it a try. 
Psychoanalysis has its defects in its theory and certainly in its 
practice, but none of these are those that Dr. Fedotar mentions. . 


